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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BENCH TRIAL*

GUHA KRISHNAMURTHI**
Sometimes juries are prejudiced against defendants. A jury may be predisposed
to find a defendant guilty because of the nature of the charges. They may be
predisposed to find a defendant guilty because of the reputation and demeanor
of the defendant. They may be biased against a defendant for bigoted reasons,
either consciously or not. A jury may also lack the ability to understand and
apply the law in some cases. And indeed, such kinds of juror prejudice may
pervade the jury pool.
The resulting pervasive juror prejudice imposes constitutional harms on the
defendant. Among other things, pervasive juror prejudice contravenes a
defendant’s presumption of innocence and a defendant’s right to fair trial
procedures. The way our current law handles such pervasive juror prejudice is
inadequate: courts are unlikely to delay trial when appropriate, instead relying
on voir dire and jury selection to avoid a prejudicial jury. But this is no solution,
because voir dire and jury selection are unable to cure pervasive juror prejudice.
In this Article, I proffer the first comprehensive, multimodal argument that
defendants have a constitutional right to bench trial. First, I explain that as a
theoretical matter, providing the defendant with the unilateral option of a bench
trial with the requirement of a reasoned opinion is the only effective way to
combat pervasive juror prejudice. Second, I show that the empirical and
historical evidence confirm that the problem of pervasive prejudice is substantial:
it arises frequently, including in the most high-profile cases; prosecutors do refuse
consent to bench trial in cases where prejudice may arise; and the purported
solutions of voir dire and jury selection are ineffectual. Finally, I show that, as
a doctrinal matter, the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment—including with
respect to the right to waive counsel, the right to a unanimous jury trial verdict,
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and the Court’s response to racism in jury selection and jury deliberations—
shows that the defendant has the unilateral right to bench trial.
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INTRODUCTION
Some criminal defendants are widely despised.1 That might be because of
the nature of the allegations against them or their proposed defenses.2 It might
be because of their manner or demeanor.3 It might be because of their prior
acts.4 It might be because of their notoriety, perhaps unrelated to anything
criminal.5 It might be because others say so.6 And as we know all too well, it
1. See, e.g., Bob Carlson, Defense of the Unpopular: Lawyers Should Not Suffer Backlash for Defending
Rights
of
Unsympathetic
Clients,
ABA
J.
(July
1,
2019,
12:50
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/defense-unpopular-clients
[https://perma.cc/P8DF48EW (dark archive)] (discussing John Adams’s representation, in 1770, of British soldiers who were
accused of killing five colonists in the Boston Massacre and widely hated).
2. See, e.g., Susan Zalkind, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Trial Set To Start Despite Attempts To Delay
Proceedings,
BOS.
MAG.
(Jan.
2,
2015,
2:58
PM),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2015/01/02/tsarnaev-trial-boston-date-january-5/
[https://
perma.cc/9ZUL-E7JA (dark archive)] (detailing Tsarnaev’s argument that a fair jury trial would be
impossible because of the impact and trauma of the Boston Marathon bombing); Michael L. Perlin,
“For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants
with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 208 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor
Outlaw”] (“Insanity pleaders are among the most despised individuals in our society . . . .”). When this
Article was first drafted, the Supreme Court was slated to consider whether the sentencing jury in
Tsarnaev’s trial was infected with bias based on their exposure to news media about the Boston
Marathon bombing. Amy Howe, Justices Will Decide Whether To Reinstate Death Penalty for Boston
Marathon
Bomber,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar.
22,
2021,
5:06
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/justices-will-decide-whether-to-reinstate-death-penaltyfor-boston-marathon-bomber/ [https://perma.cc/SYH2-5D9D]. The Court decided the case in March
2022, holding that the district court did not err in refusing to ask jurors about their exposure to pretrial
publicity, and that even such bias would not imply a juror could not be unbiased and impartial. United
States v. Tsarnaev, No. 20–443, slip op. at 9–10 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2022).
3. See Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV.
573, 575–76 (2008) (“High-profile criminal trials show that jurors use a defendant’s courtroom
demeanor to determine his sincerity and culpability. The impression that the defendant makes on the
jury can thus have an enormous impact on the outcome of the trial.”). Levenson discusses a number of
cases, including those of Lorena Bobbitt, Erik and Lyle Menendez, and Timothy McVeigh. Id. at 592–
96.
4. See, e.g., Julia T. Rickert, Denying Defendants the Benefit of a Reasonable Doubt: Federal Rule of
Evidence 609 and Past Sex Crime Convictions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 213 (2010)
(“[O]verwhelming evidence shows that sex offenders are the most feared and despised group in this
country . . . .”); O.J. Simpson’s Lawyers Request Another Trial, CNN (Oct. 10,
2008), https://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/10/simpson.newtrial/ [https://perma.cc/8BTG-YTFZ]
(raising unsuccessfully the claim that some jurors’ disagreement with Simpson’s acquittal in the 1995
double homicide case may have tainted the jury’s verdict).
5. Bethany McLean, Everything You Know About Martin Shkreli Is Wrong—or Is It?, VANITY FAIR
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/12/martin-shkreli-pharmaceuticals-ceointerview [https://perma.cc/YBN5-BZDZ (dark archive)] (“Even before his arrest this week on
securities fraud allegations, Wall Street’s most visible villain was infamous for gouging AIDS patients
and pregnant women, buying a very overpriced Wu-Tang Clan album, and trolling the world on
Twitter.”).
6. Tim Rutten, The Threat of Nancy Grace, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2011-jul-23-la-oe-rutten-nancy-grace-20110723-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9H4L-D69V (dark archive)] (“Anyone who had occasion to watch [Nancy Grace’s]
relentless coverage of the recently completed Casey Anthony murder trial witnessed something quite
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might be because of their race, gender, orientation, ethnicity, or religion.7 The
potential reasons are myriad. What is clear, however, is that these dispositions
toward many defendants are not rare, and they obdurately persist. A
fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system is that every defendant
deserves a fair trial with proper procedures and the presumption of innocence.
But how can our system ensure that for the despised defendant when they stand
adjudged by a jury that might hate, fear, or inherently distrust them?
Consider a fictional example: a young, bombastic person takes over as
CEO of a large company. Within the bounds of the law, the company adopts a
number of policies that are unpopular with its customers and exploitative of its
workers. When asked about it, the CEO is unapologetic. This becomes the
source of considerable public acrimony. The CEO embraces it. Now, because
of the company’s market share and position within the industry, people have no
recourse to discipline the company. They simply must live with the
company’s—and the CEO’s—behavior.8
Thereafter, seemingly because of the CEO’s notorious profile, the CEO
and company come under suspicion of having engaged in financial crimes. In
due course, the CEO is indicted. Plea negotiations do not reach settlement and
the CEO wishes to exercise their constitutional right to go to trial. The CEO’s
attorneys are worried. They explain that, because of the CEO’s renown, most
everyone in the jury pool will know the CEO and will likely have a poor
impression of the CEO. Furthermore, the attorneys explain that the nature of
the alleged financial crimes are complex and technical, so juror impressions of
the CEO are likely to have strong weight in the case. Indeed, with at least some

new to the American news media: a mainstream news organization giving one of its commentators a
nightly forum from which to campaign for the conviction of a criminal defendant. It was a campaign
that continued after Anthony’s acquittal with virtually nonstop on-air abuse of the jurors and defense
attorneys.”).
7. See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861, 869 (2017) (holding that, as an exception
to the rule allowing no impeachment of a jury’s deliberations, there can be an investigation into a jury’s
verdict where a juror made a clear statement of racial animus, such as, in the instant case, statements
expressing “anti-Hispanic bias toward petitioner and petitioner’s alibi witness”); United States v.
Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1986) (overturning defendant’s conviction for tax evasion
because of juror misconduct when jurors made anti-Semitic slurs about the defendant); Christian B.
Sundquist, Uncovering Juror Racial Bias, 96 DENV. L. REV. 309, 313 (2019) (discussing juror racial bias
and stating that “[i]t has proven difficult to shed the racial bias ingrained in the American adversarial
process”); Adam Romero & Ilan Meyer, Anti-Gay Bias Has No Place in Our Juries, JURIST (Apr. 2, 2019,
1:48 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/04/adam-romero-ilan-meyer-anti-gay-bias/
[https://perma.cc/G8MX-BCUJ] (describing Rhines v. Young, 899 F.3d 482 (8th Cir. 2018), where
there was evidence that jurors exhibited anti-gay bias in deliberations on whether defendant should be
sentenced to death).
8. The example I have provided is fictional but inspired by the reported behavior of real
individuals. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 5 (discussing Martin Shkreli and the pricing strategy of his
pharmaceutical company on certain drugs relating to pregnancy and HIV).
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jurors, these impressions may supplant the legal questions altogether. The
attorneys therefore suggest opting for a bench trial, and the CEO concurs.
The CEO and his attorneys promptly request a bench trial. The
prosecution objects, stating that the public has a strong interest in adjudging
the defendant CEO’s guilt or innocence, and thus, the prosecution wants a jury
to hear the case. One might suspect, however, among the prosecutor’s unstated
reasons is that, due to the CEO’s notoriety and otherwise distasteful profile,
the jury will be predisposed to find the CEO guilty. The judge informs the
defendant CEO that they will proceed to a jury trial—there is no right to bench
trial in that jurisdiction and all parties must consent for one to be granted.9
The judge understands the defendant CEO’s societal status, or lack
thereof, and the accompanying concern. But not to worry, the judge assures,
because the judge will instruct the jury to treat the defendant CEO fairly at
every turn. The CEO and attorneys remain unassuaged. The case proceeds to
trial and the jury convicts.
Or consider another example: the defendant, a young, Central American
immigrant man, is accused of committing a violent crime against a white
woman. The evidence is not overwhelming, and there are potential alibi claims
for the defendant. The alleged crime takes place in a community where there is
a growing rage against immigration and immigrants, especially from Central
America. Some politicians have continually expressed anger and fear at
“invading,” “violent” immigrants that threaten their “way of life.” They claim
that crime rates have soared against white individuals and that these immigrants
are seeking to replace the white population. Many people in the jurisdiction
expressly support these politicians and this anti-immigration platform; many
more are silently sympathetic to these views, and together they make up a solid
majority of voting citizens. The defendant’s counsel is well aware of this and
requests a bench trial. The elected prosecutor rejects this request, stating that
the community has a right to seek vindication on behalf of the victim. This
jurisdiction does not allow for the unilateral right to bench trial either, and the
elected judge unquestioningly follows the statute. But the judge states that voir
dire will ensure an impartial jury.10 After jury selection, an all-white jury from
the locality is chosen. Defense counsel urges the defendant to seek a plea, which
9. For one example, consider Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 23(a):
If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless:
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
(2) the government consents; and
(3) the court approves.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). For other jurisdictions, see infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
10. Voir dire is the “preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide
whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.” Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
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results in a sentence that is nearly eighty percent of the average sentence for the
crime.
In each case, improper biases might have influenced the jury—and that
can result in illegitimate convictions or coerced pleas. In most cases, it is
impossible to know what happened in the jury deliberation room. But that need
not stop us from recognizing that something has gone wrong in these cases.
Moreover, these cases are not rare. The same sort of situation, where a jury is
predisposed to have animus or fear toward the defendant, occurs in several
different types of cases: a woman accused of surreptitiously murdering her
wealthy husband, someone accused of child abuse, pedophilia, or possessing and
distributing child pornography, or an Arab Muslim person accused of terrorism.
There are plausible reasons to doubt that these defendants will genuinely
receive a fair trial. Like the general public, the jurors—the decision makers in
this case—may have overwhelming, irrational biases against these defendants.
These biases, in turn, may have an impact in the jurors’ decisions to convict.
And even if the jurors’ decisions were not in fact impacted by biases against the
defendants, the appearance of such failures in our justice system is itself
problematic. Consequently, the proceeding becomes tainted.
What could be done in such situations? The honest answer: not much.
Courts are highly unlikely to dismiss charges because a fair jury cannot be
selected.11 Indeed, courts are unlikely to even delay or move a trial for juror
prejudice.12 Instead, courts rest on voir dire and jury selection to filter out biased
or unable jurors and jury instructions to explain to jurors how they can
adjudicate fairly.13 The problems with these purported solutions are manifold:
voir dire is an uncertain process; it can be difficult for attorneys and judges to
determine facts about the mental state or disposition of jurors. Moreover, it
may be difficult for jurors themselves to understand their true dispositions.14
And even if such prejudice can be identified, when such prejudice pervades the
jury pool, selection simply cannot result in a fair jury.15 For similar reasons,
even the best formulated instructions may not do the requisite work, because
jurors may not even recognize their biases and deficiencies. Indeed, the
empirical and historical evidence confirms this in droves.16 The result is that the

11. See infra Section III.A.
12. See infra Section III.A.
13. See infra Section III.A.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 n.5 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Because the bias of a
juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, ‘partly because the juror may have an interest in
concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it . . . .’” (quoting Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
15. See infra Section III.A for an explanation of why it might be hard to determine juror beliefs
or thoughts.
16. See infra Section III.A.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1621 (2022)

2022]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BENCH TRIAL

1627

system fails to safeguard the constitutional rights of many defendants—who are
the targets of these forms of juror prejudice.
What should be done in such situations? I contend that our system must
provide the defendant with a unilateral right to choose a bench trial.17 When a
defendant asks for a bench trial instead of a jury trial, the request should be
granted—regardless of what the prosecutor and court say. Importantly, it is not
just that it would be good or efficient to do so; this is not simply a matter of
systemic or personal preference. Rather, I contend that the Constitution requires
that we recognize the defendant’s unilateral right to bench trial.
The rest of this Article is devoted to making that constitutional case. I
utilize a comprehensive, multimodal approach to make this argument. First, I
explain that as a theoretical matter, providing the defendant with the unilateral
option of a bench trial, with the requirement of a reasoned opinion, is the only
effective way to combat pervasive juror prejudice without jeopardizing the
defendant’s constitutional rights. Second, I show that the empirical and
historical evidence confirm that the problem of pervasive prejudice is
17. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xlii–xliii
(2015) (“The prosecution has many institutional advantages, not the least being that they get to go first
and . . . have their theory of the case laid out before the defendant can present any evidence at all. I
would think it fair to let the defendant get the choice of judge or jury.” (emphasis omitted)); Evan G.
Hall, Note, The House Always Wins: Systemic Disadvantage for Criminal Defendants and the Case Against
the Prosecutorial Veto, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1717, 1727–37 (2017) (arguing for elimination of a
prosecutorial veto to bench trial to equalize the power differential between prosecutors and
defendants); Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1495, 1549 (2006) (providing a probabilistic and empirical argument, employing the concept of
ambiguity aversion, to contend that providing bench trials would eliminate inefficient prosecutor
leverage over defendants); Adam H. Kurland, Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with a Unilateral
Right to a Bench Trial: A Renewed Call To Amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), 26 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 309, 316–17 (1993) (arguing for allowing defendant to opt unilaterally for bench trial in federal
criminal proceedings for a variety of policy reasons, including complexity of federal criminal law and
vindicating defendant’s right to testify without juror prejudice due to impeachment by prior act
evidence); Jon Fieldman, Comment, Singer v. United States and the Misapprehended Source of the
Nonconsensual Bench Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 222, 222–23 (1984) (arguing that the requirement of
government consent should be removed once the defendant has shown juror partiality); Note,
Government Consent to Waiver of Jury Trial Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 65
YALE L.J. 1032, 1042–44 (1956) (discussing the requirement of government consent to bench trial
regarding the case United States v. Silverman, Crim. No. 9111, D. Conn. (Mar. 29, 1956), and suggesting
that such waiver should be solely with the defendant); Richard C. Donnelly, The Defendant’s Right To
Waive Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 247, 247–59 (1956) (discussing the state of
doctrine on unilateral waiver, concluding it is not constitutionally required, but suggesting a courtapproval rule based on whether defendant’s waiver is knowing and intelligent); Tim Lynch, The Right
To Choose: Trial by Jury, or Judge, CATO INST. (June 27, 2016), https://www.cato.org/commentary/rightchoose-trial-jury-or-judge# [https://perma.cc/PZJ3-NVAM] (discussing Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24 (1965), and suggesting reasons in fairness to allow defendants optionality). See generally Fred
Anthony DeCicco, Note, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A Reassessment of the
“Prosecutorial Veto,” 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1983) (recognizing potential constitutional harms
but arguing for a court-approval rule, in order to balance the interest of jury trial against the defendant’s
interest in an impartial trial).
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substantial. It arises frequently, including in the most high-profile cases, and
the purported solutions of voir dire and jury selection are ineffectual. Finally, I
show that, as a doctrinal matter, this interpretation of the Sixth Amendment,
including with respect to the right of counsel and the right to a unanimous jury
trial verdict, demonstrates that the defendant has the right to waive a jury trial
and opt for a bench trial. To be clear, the defendant’s right to bench trial is no
panacea. Judges—who are, after all, humans—may be inflicted with the same
types of biases that impact juries. But with systemic features, like reasoned
opinions, appellate review, and perhaps multi-judge panels, bench trials may
offer defendants a fair(er) proceeding, when juries cannot. The defendant has
the constitutional right to choose.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I provide a brief history and
explanation of the role of the jury, the presumption of innocence, and the right
to fair trial procedures. I then explain the phenomena of pervasive juror bias
and deficiency. Part II defines the contours of the law regarding bench trials
and the current state of their deployment. Part III proffers the theoretical case
for the right to bench trial. Part IV grounds this argument in history and
empirical evidence. Part V bolsters this argument with a doctrinal analysis of
the Sixth Amendment. I briefly conclude with observations about how this
intervention fits in the greater program of reforming our criminal justice
system.
I. THE JURY AND FAIR TRIALS
A.

The Jury

The right to jury trial in criminal proceedings is enshrined in the
Constitution, principally in the Sixth Amendment.18 The Sixth Amendment
states in relevant part,

18. The right to jury trial is also mentioned in Article III, Section 2: “The Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be
at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The text
itself seems to suggest that this is not as much a right as it is a command that, in Article III proceedings,
all criminal cases must be decided by jury. The Court has rejected that textual reading, instead
understanding Article III to pose no conflict to the rights formulation in the Sixth Amendment. Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (“Upon this view of the constitutional provisions we
conclude that Article III, Section 2, is not jurisdictional, but was meant to confer a right upon the
accused which he may forego at his election. To deny his power to do so, is to convert a privilege into
an imperative requirement.”). Notably, the jury trial right does not attach to every criminal proceeding.
Through a series of cases, the Court has made clear that the right to a jury only applies when one charge
carries more than six months incarceration. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970); Lewis v.
United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323–24 (1996).
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation . . . .19
Based on the prefatory language “the accused shall enjoy the right,” it
seems clear that this was primarily understood as serving to safeguard the
defendant’s rights.20 In order for the defendant to be adjudged guilty of a crime,
the defendant has the right to insist that a jury of their peers renders a verdict
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And as the Supreme Court recently held,
that verdict must be unanimous.21 This is a high bar. Convincing any one person
of anything beyond a reasonable doubt is challenging, so convincing a panel of
randomly drawn persons is all the more difficult.
Under a standard view, the motivation behind the institution of the jury
is that it is representative of the community, or at least more so than courts and
judges.22 Because of this representational benefit, juries are democratically
empowered and can “fight tyranny and legitimate the law.”23 This has led to the
understanding of the jury as a “bulwark” of liberty, standing between the
government and the criminal defendant.24
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
20. Id. Some scholars, primarily Laura Appleman, disagree with this proposition. Laura I.
Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 406 (2009). Appleman marshals
the history of the evolution of the jury and early sources, contemporaneous with the Constitution, to
argue that the jury trial right was seen as a right of the collective community. In response to Appleman’s
position, I contend that the placement of the right in the Sixth Amendment strongly suggests, at least
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment grant, that the right is principally a protection for the defendant.
Appleman suggests the protection for the defendant is that the right be speedy and impartial, and that
the jury trial right remains the collective. This is a textually plausible reading, but not a dispositive
one. The text simply is not enough. And regardless, as Appleman recognizes, the current state of the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right is understood as one in service of the defendant. Id. at 440
(“[T]wentieth-century courts have assigned the jury trial right almost exclusively to defendants . . . .”).
In an important article, Barbara Underwood contends that race discrimination in jury selection violates
the equal protection rights of the jurors to participate in the critical democratic institution of the jury.
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 725, 742–43 (1992). My view is completely consistent with this position: insofar as
there is a jury, all should have the equal right to serve on it; but the people do not have the right to
insist that a defendant be tried by jury.
21. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020).
22. Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. 849, 878 (2014) (“Juries
are better positioned to assess matters reflecting their communities’ values than are judges because they
are more representative of their communities than judges. In contrast to judges, juries are drawn from
the local vicinage and are considered bodies ‘truly representative of the community.’” (citation
omitted)).
23. Id. at 880.
24. Id. at 856 (stating that juries “act as a bulwark of liberty and invite citizen participation in the
government”); Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 377, 428 (“The jury’s power over criminal law certainly meant that it might serve as a bulwark of
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Under current law, juries are primarily supposed to be the “finders of fact,”
with judges deciding questions of law.25 But the criminal jury’s role goes beyond
purely “factual” determinations. Juries are called upon to answer a number of
hybrid factual-legal questions that implicate moral questions, such as when
jurors are called to determine if conduct is “‘reckless,’ ‘without consent,’
‘depraved,’ ‘grave,’ ‘cruel,’ ‘wanton,’ ‘heinous,’ ‘debased,’ [a] ‘perversion,’ and
‘impair[s] or debase[s] the morals.’”26 Indeed, juries are called upon to render a
verdict itself, which is at its core a hybrid determination, combining fact, law,
and individual and societal moral considerations.27
Juries may in fact have a larger role to play than simply making factual
determinations and answering rare hybrid fact-law questions. Jury nullification
refers to the
jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply
the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social
issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by
law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.28
Because a jury’s decision to acquit is generally final and unappealable by
the government, juries have the absolute power to nullify. There is a question
about whether this is a design feature or a bug: some maintain that juries are
entrusted with this power as a way to serve as a check against other power
structures.29 Others contend that nullification is a pathological outcome that our

liberty by acquitting defendants who were the subject of a malicious or oppressive prosecution.”); see
also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and
State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government.”). Actually, the defendant in Duncan did not want a bench trial,
perhaps due to the nature of judges. Id. at 146. And sometimes juries will be better than judges.
Defendants should have the right to make that determination and choice.
25. See Harrington, supra note 24, at 377 (stating “[i]t has become something of an article of faith
in the legal community that it is ‘the duty of the court to expound the law[,] and that of the jury to
apply the law as thus declared[,]’” and “[i]n practice, this is often interpreted to mean that the judge
alone has the power to determine the law and the jury is limited to applying the law to the facts,” but
that this division is more recent than previously thought and the jury should have a role in finding the
law (quoting Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895))).
26. Youngjae Lee, The Criminal Jury, Moral Judgments, and Political Representation, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1255, 1260. Lee recognizes that juries must make moral judgments but questions what perspective
they should ultimately take in doing so. He ultimately rejects the claim that juries should be stewards
of community standards, and instead that they should apply their own perspective, which will in the
aggregate produce a diversity of views that reflect the community standards. Id. at 1285–88.
27. Id. at 1262–63.
28. Jury Nullification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Paul Butler, Racially
Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700–01 (1995)
(further defining jury nullification).
29. CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 5, 13 (2014);
Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1228 (1993) (“[J]ury nullification
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system must tolerate in order to allow for the benefits of juries, and that
nullification should be appropriately cabined.30 But, importantly, those who
believe in the propriety of jury nullification believe that it is a power to favor
the defendant. Nullification cannot be used to disadvantage a defendant, that
is, to find a defendant guilty when acquittal would be appropriate.
B.

The Presumption of Innocence

Criminal defendants are entitled to a “presumption of innocence.”31 This
is true as a matter of our constitutional law, but it is also a cornerstone of most
criminal legal systems.32 The precise meaning of this presumption can be
difficult to pin, however. As Larry Laudan quipped, “It is . . . mildly
disconcerting to discover that there is little consensus about precisely what the
presumption of innocence means.”33
As a rough first pass, one might define “presumption of innocence” as
requiring that defendants subjected to criminal inquiry be treated as though
they are innocent, until and unless proven otherwise (to the requisite standard
of proof).34 That notion of the presumption of innocence, though perhaps
admirable, is unfortunately false. In our system, the presumption of innocence
has been duly cabined as a trial right.35 Indeed, courts may make a pretrial
determination of the likelihood of a defendant’s guilt in deciding to deny a
defendant bail and jail them.36
But even as a trial right, there has been a great deal of scholarly and judicial
confusion over what the presumption of innocence is and requires. Some have
suggested that the presumption of innocence has a meta-rule status that gives
rise to the allocation of burdens, the right to silence, the right to counsel, the
right to confrontation, and the right to discovery.37 In Bell v. Wolfish,38 the Court
characterized the presumption of innocence as follows:
was a popular tool by which English and colonial juries shielded their citizens from government
tyranny.”).
30. See Lawrence W. Crispo, Jill M. Slansky & Geanene M. Yriarte, Jury Nullification: Law Versus
Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1997) (arguing that jury nullification is inconsistent with the
rule of law).
31. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).
32. Id. at 453–54; Larry Laudan, The Presumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory?, 11 LEGAL
THEORY 333, 333 (2005) (stating “[t]he presumption of innocence . . . is among the small handful of
doctrines in criminal law that are ubiquitous across a very broad spectrum of legal systems”).
33. Laudan, supra note 32, at 334.
34. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 724–25 (2011).
35. Laudan, supra note 32, at 337–38.
36. Id. at 339; Baradaran, supra note 34, at 724–25.
37. William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 333–34 (1995).
38. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of
proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury
to judge an accused’s guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced
at trial and not on the basis of suspicions that may arise from the fact of
his arrest, indictment, or custody, or from other matters not introduced
as proof at trial.39
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that the high standard of proof is
requisite to safeguard the presumption of innocence.40
The precise contours of the presumption of innocence remain in flux.
Here, I follow Laudan in understanding the presumption of innocence as
limited—it is a trial right that jurors maintain the probatory innocence of the
defendant.41 This means that jurors are to maintain, at the beginning of trial,
that the case against the defendant has not reached the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and that the defendant’s appearance before the tribunal does
not count as evidence of any determination of guilt.42 Indeed, this accords with
the Court’s explanation in Bell.43
C.

The Right to Fair Trial Procedures

Apart from the presumption of innocence, a defendant also has the right
to fair trial procedures.44 Defendants cannot be adjudged guilty through random
processes like rolling dice or flipping coins—that would offend due process.45
Nor can defendants be adjudged guilty through nonprobative evidence.46 If a
trial included the testimony of, say, an astrologer or psychic who testified that
39. Id. at 533.
40. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1972) (“A high standard of proof is necessary, we
said, to ensure against unjust convictions by giving substance to the presumption of innocence.”).
41. Laudan, supra note 32, at 341–43.
42. Id. at 343–46.
43. Bell, 441 U.S. at 533.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“As applied to a
criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice.”).
45. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a
scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case
where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.”); Scott Phillips &
Justin Marceau, Whom the State Kills, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585, 633–35 (2020) (discussing how
a coin-toss procedure in clemency proceedings would offend due process); see also Adam M. Samaha,
Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 27 (2009) (“For judges, flipping coins is an
easy way to draw misconduct sanctions. It is a basis for penalties well beyond mere reversal by an
appellate court.”).
46. See In re Glasmann, 286 P.3d 673, 677, 679–80 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (holding that a
prosecutor’s use of an altered booking photo of the defendant in closing was improper and required
reversal, stating “[a]lthough a prosecutor has wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the
evidence[,] a prosecutor must ‘seek convictions based only on probative evidence and sound reason’”
(citations omitted)).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1621 (2022)

2022]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BENCH TRIAL

1633

the defendant was guilty on the basis of supernatural information, that, too,
would offend due process, because—at least as a matter of our legal system—
astrology and psychic extrasensory perception are not probative sources of
evidence.47
In the same vein, if jurors assess a defendant to be guilty because they
believe people who are serious or quiet are generally more dangerous, then,
because that is false, that would be convicting based on nonprobative evidence.48
Or if jurors were to adjudge a defendant guilty because of their race, ethnicity,
or religion, then that too would be an unsound judgment based on nonprobative
evidence.49 These jury determinations would violate the defendant’s rights.
Additionally, if jurors were tasked with duties that they did not have the
ability to complete, that, too, may offend due process. For example, if some set
of jurors did not understand spoken English and no translator was provided,
then asking those jurors to process evidence presented in English would not be
possible for them. That would be a due process violation.50
Finally, it is axiomatic that a defendant cannot be convicted unless the
finder of fact determines that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
This is a staple of the Anglo-American criminal justice system, and it is required
as a constitutional matter.51 This is a high standard of proof, and indeed it is
often identified as the highest standard of proof in the law.52 If a juror convicts
short of this standard, then that would offend due process.53 For example,
suppose jurors are fairly certain the defendant committed the crime, but they
have some lingering doubts. Nevertheless, they decide to convict—perhaps
because they think the defendant is dangerous or otherwise deserving of
punishment. That decision fails to afford the defendant their right to be

47. Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473, 484
(1996) (“[I]t seems uncontroversial that no court would permit, for example, a conviction based on the
testimony of an astrologer who contended that the defendant’s astrological chart demonstrated that he
was guilty, or a medium who claimed that the dead victim named the murderer.”).
48. In general, defendants do not always have a remedy for such violations of their rights, because
juror deliberations are, with notable exception for bigoted animus, not open for investigation. PenaRodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017) (discussing the jury no-impeachment rule).
49. Id. at 869 (holding that there is an exception to the jury no-impeachment rule in cases where
juror deliberations are tainted by racial animus).
50. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
115, 122 (1987).
51. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
52. Michael D. Pepson & John N. Sharifi, Lego v. Twomey: The Improbable Relationship Between
an Obscure Supreme Court Decision and Wrongful Convictions, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185, 1194 (2010)
(“The highest standard of proof—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—is reserved for criminal cases
where, at least insofar as elements of the charged offense are concerned, its status as a constitutional
imperative is axiomatic.”).
53. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the beyonda-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal proceedings).
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convicted only if adjudged guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—and consequently
violates the defendant’s constitutional rights.
D.

Juror Bias and Deficiency

Jurors are tasked with making determinations about the defendant’s guilt,
or determinations that will directly bear on the ultimate determination of guilt.
In so doing, the jury must afford the defendant the presumption of innocence,
and they must follow directions regarding the proper analysis of the evidence.
Certainly, jurors can fail in these regards: they may have biases that disrupt the
presumption of innocence, and they may also lack the ability to follow
directions, which in turn results in a trial that fails in its truth function.
There are many potential biases and deficiencies that jurors may bring to
a case that disrupt the presumption of innocence or the fairness of trial
procedures. I identify four categories of these harms.
First, jurors may have biases related to the nature of the crime and criminal
proceedings. For example, in the most general sense, jurors may regard the fact
that the defendant was apprehended for a crime and appears before the criminal
justice system as some evidence of the defendant’s guilt. This is commonly what
jury instructions on the presumption of innocence are supposed to guard
against.54
But there are other ways this bias may manifest. Jurors may think a
defendant accused of a heinous crime is more likely to be worthy of punishment.
For example, jurors may regard those accused of violent crimes or sex crimes
with fear or animus.55 That might cause them to think that the defendant was
54. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
55. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the
Impulse To Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1485 (1997) (observing that the typical juror
employs stereotypical views of violent criminals, engendering certain emotional reactions); Erica
Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony and Intellectual Due
Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 392 (2003) (“The anchoring heuristic suggests that because the
jurors first learned about the defendant in the context of a graphically violent crime, they are likely to
persist in thinking of the defendant as violent, even in the face of contrary evidence.”); Bruce M.
Lyons, Defending Violent Crimes Cases, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Nov. 1999, at 35, 43 (“It is the rare juror who
is not repelled by the idea of one person doing a violent act to another, and this repulsion is apt to
distract the juror from weighing the facts dispassionately.”); Catherine L. Carpenter, The
Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 296–98 (2006)
(describing sex crimes as the most feared crimes, with such fear only continuing to escalate, resulting
in a litany of difficulties and dangers facing sex offenders); Michael P. Griffin & Desirée A. West, The
Lowest of the Low? Addressing the Disparity Between Community View, Public Policy, and Treatment
Effectiveness for Sex Offenders, 30 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 143, 156–57 (2006) (explaining that sex offenders
are seen as extremely dangerous and immutably deviant). The levels of fear and animus are more
intense with respect to sex crimes involving children. See Rickert, supra note 4, at 228 (observing that
“condemnation is infinitely swifter and more enduring when the alleged victim is a child”); Anna K.
LaRoy, Comment, Discovering Child Pornography: The Death of the Presumption of Innocence, 6 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 559, 559–60 (2008) (“The media and the public are ready to condemn those accused
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more likely to commit the crime, thus instilling the fact that the defendant is
before the tribunal as having some evidentiary value that it does not or should
not have. Or it might lead jurors to think that, whatever the evidence, the
person is more likely to be dangerous or terrible such that it is worth convicting
them and punishing them. It could be a combination of both, where the jury
adjusts the standard of proof based on the gravity of the charges.
Second, jurors may have biases related to the individual defendant, based
on such things as the defendant’s reputation or demeanor. A prime example of
such reputation bias concerns the defendant’s prior acts, especially crimes. In
general, jurors are greatly influenced by information about prior acts and
crimes, beyond their probative value.56 Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 404
addresses this point directly, by excluding “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act [offered] to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” and
creating further procedures for a prosecutor who plans on introducing such
evidence for permitted purposes.57 But of course, if such information is already
known to the jury, then Rule 404 may have little impact in reducing the
prejudice to the defendant.58
Jurors may also have biases against a defendant because of their demeanor.
Jurors may believe that a defendant who appears calm, serious, and collected
during a trial of a gruesome crime or a crime against a child, partner, relative,
or close associate is likely to have committed the crime.59 But this is not
probative evidence of the defendant committing the crime. There are any
number of explanations of a defendant’s behavior that have nothing to do with
the defendant’s guilt: counsel may have coached the defendant to behave like
that or the defendant may simply have a different way of processing grief.
Indeed, the defendant’s apparent behavior may be an innate or otherwise
immutable feature of the defendant’s personality. Nevertheless, jurors may be
swayed by these facts, either consciously or unconsciously.60
Third, jurors may have biases related to immutable features of the
defendant or the defendant’s membership in a protected class. In its most
of child sex crimes well before they have had their chance to present a defense, often before the
prosecution even has enough evidence for a formal charge.”).
56. J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J.
831, 831, 838 (1989).
57. FED. R. EVID. 404. Rule 404 allows prior act, crimes, or wrongs for other purposes “such as
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.” Id. But if such evidence is to be presented in a criminal case, the prosecutor must provide
notice and a specific articulation for why such evidence fits the purported admissible purpose. Id.
58. United States v. King, 254 F.3d 1098, 1101 n.* (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that exposing the
jury to inappropriate character information, and merely relying on instructions, would “eviscerate Rule
404(b)”).
59. Levenson, supra note 3, at 577–78.
60. Id. at 624.
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common instance, there is the all-too-familiar story of jurors regarding
defendants of a particular race as predisposed to guilt.61 Jurors may also have
animus against those defendants of different religions or ethnicities, such that
they do not apply the proper standard in deciding whether to punish them.62
Fourth, jurors may lack the ability to follow directions in the assessment of
evidence. In particular, they may not be able to assess evidence for their limited
purposes, as defined by the law, as with evidence of prior crimes and acts
relevant to a testifying defendant’s credibility but not to whether the defendant
committed the act. And jurors may not be able to fully understand the limited
probative value of other forms of evidence, like eye-witness testimony,
confessions, and the like.63
These categories are not meant to be mutually exclusive.64 Jurors can
exhibit multiple of these biases and deficiencies, and indeed it may be that bias
leads to the jury’s deficiency as well. Also, these categories are meant to be
representative but perhaps not exhaustive. There may be other varieties of bias
or deficiency that impact jurors as well.
At the same time, jurors are not required to be a tabula rasa when they
serve.65 Our system does not expect jurors to come to the courtroom without
any preexisting beliefs or understandings.66 That would be an impractical and
unproductive demand. Our system understands that jurors are human and have
predispositions based on their life experiences. For the most part, these are
beneficial predispositions, because our system wants jurors to represent the
polity and societal attitudes.67 Indeed, this may serve to safeguard the rights of
the defendant.68
Determining which predispositions are impermissible biases and which are
permissible features of the human experience is difficult work. Many of these
determinations will be inherently controversial, especially in the context of an
adversarial system. Similarly, in practice there is little ability to determine
61. See infra notes 224–33 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 243–52 and accompanying text.
64. DeCicco, supra note 17, at 1091 (discussing the Singer case and identifying “massive pretrial
publicity,” “the particularly heinous nature of the crime charged,” and “characteristics of the defendant
such as race, religion or prior criminal record” as potential bases for juror prejudice).
65. United States v. Taylor, 777 F.3d 434, 441 (7th Cir. 2015) (“A prospective juror does not
come to the courtroom as a tabula rasa. The important question is whether the juror can put aside the
experiences and beliefs that may prejudice his view of the case and render a verdict based on the
evidence and the law.”).
66. Thompson v. Parker, 867 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 2017) (“But impartiality and indifference
do not require ignorance. Because ‘jurors will have opinions from their life experiences, it would be
impractical for the Sixth Amendment to require that each juror’s mind be a tabula rasa.’” (citation
omitted)).
67. Ryan, supra note 22, at 878.
68. Id. at 856.
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whether jurors can actually properly analyze the evidence dispassionately and
rigorously.
But even if practically difficult to resolve, that does not mean these
questions are utterly intractable: jurors clearly should not regard a defendant
accused of a grievous crime as guilty or worthy of punishment simply because
they have been so accused. Similarly, jurors should not regard prior criminal
acts or reputation as dispositive of the instant charges. And jurors should not
use race, ethnicity, or religion as evidence of guilt. Moreover, it is generally
clear that a juror who cannot or will not follow judicial instructions should not
be deciding the case (saving room for nullification).
II. BENCH TRIALS: DEFINITION AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE
At its most basic definition, a bench trial is a trial in which the factfinder
is a judge instead of civilian jurors. Thus, in addition to determining the
governing law, the necessary factual determinations and the ultimate verdict are
decided by the judge. In most all jurisdictions, bench trials are conducted with
one judge. That is not a necessity, however, because bench trials could expand
to include more judges.69
One feature of bench trials is that they often come with a reasoned
explanation by the judge. That explanation usually sets forth the governing
statute and any important legal doctrines, then lays out how the evidence
presented supports the judge’s factual determinations and, consequently, their
verdict. In some jurisdictions, this is formally required.70 In others, it is not
required.71
In most states, the defendant has no unfettered right to bench trial. Many
states require jury trials in death penalty cases.72 In noncapital cases, only a few

69. Connecticut allows defendants to opt for a three-judge-panel bench trial in cases “punishable
by . . . life imprisonment without the possibility of release or life imprisonment.” CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-82(b) (Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.). This also includes crimes punishable by “death,” but
Connecticut has since abolished the death penalty. See State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 85 (Conn. 2015).
70. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c) states: “In a case tried without a jury, the court
must find the defendant guilty or not guilty. If a party requests before the finding of guilty or not
guilty, the court must state its specific findings of fact in open court or in a written decision or opinion.”
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c); see also United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 869 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(“A defendant’s request for special findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c) must be granted and the
Court’s findings, reasoning, and conclusions must be adequate to enable intelligent appellate review of
the basis for the decision.” (citing United States v. Pinner, 561 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Johnson, 496 F.2d 1131, 1138 (5th Cir. 1974))).
71. Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c) states: “In a case tried without a jury the court shall
make a general finding.” OHIO R. CRIM. P. 23(c). This has been interpreted not to require a detailed
statement explaining the verdict; the statement of the verdict is sufficient. See State v. Ham, 3d Dist.
Wyandot No. 16-09-01, 2009-Ohio-3822, at ¶¶ 41–42.
72. Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 & n.49 (1980) (listing states
requiring jury determination for capital punishment).
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states afford a defendant the right to opt for bench trial without requiring the
consent of the prosecutor or the judge.73 Indeed, most states, by rule or practice,
require consent by the prosecutor.74 In a few states, the defendant need only

73. In my research, I have found eight states, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Ohio, that offer this right to defendants. See LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 17(A); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 780 (Westlaw through 2022 First Extraordinary Sess.);
IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.17(1); State v. Henderson, 287 N.W.2d 583, 585 (Iowa 1980) (holding that
defendants have a unilateral right to opt for a bench trial); MD. R. CRIM. CAUSES 4-246(b) (LEXIS
through June 13, 2022); Thomas v. State, 598 A.2d 789, 793 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (holding that
a defendant may unilaterally opt for a bench trial); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-82(a) (2021); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-1 (Westlaw through Public Act 102-730 of the 2022 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 606:7 (2022); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 23(a). Nebraska seems to allow a defendant to waive
unilaterally the right to a jury trial, but the court may require that the defendant adhere to some
reasonable conditions in exercising that right. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; State v. Carpenter, 150 N.W.2d
129, 131 (Neb. 1967) (“The right to a jury trial is personal to the defendant, and the state is without
power to require one if the defendant wishes to waive it.”); State v. Godfrey, 155 N.W.2d 438, 442–
43 (Neb. 1968) (deciding that a court may impose reasonable conditions, including on timing, for
defendant to exercise the right to waive jury trial). As mentioned, some of these states allow for capital
punishment and do not allow jury trial waiver in those cases. Additionally, many of the states do not
offer the right to waive jury trial in cases involving joinder of multiple defendants, if one defendant
wishes to proceed to a jury trial.
74. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.1(b); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 23(a); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 17; ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 18.1(b)(1); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 31.1, 31.4; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16;
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 23(a)(5)(I); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 23(a); D.C. CODE § 16-705(b)(2)
(2022); D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 23(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.260; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; IND.
CODE § 35-37-1-2 (2022); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3403(1) (2021); KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.26(1); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 763.3(1) (2022); MICH. CT. R. 6.401; Evans v. State, 547 So. 2d 38, 40 (Miss. 1989)
(citing Rule 5.13 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice and stating that “[i]t is well
settled that trial by jury in criminal cases may be waived by agreement of the prosecution except where
the death penalty is involved”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.011(1) (2022); N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-605(A);
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 23(a)(2); Valega v. City of Oklahoma City, 755 P.2d 118, 119 (Okla. Crim. App.
1988) (requiring prosecutor and court consent to waive jury trial); PA. R. CRIM. P. 620; S.C. R. CRIM.
P. 14(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-18-1 (2022); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(2)(B); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-205(a) (LEXIS through Ch. 877 (except Chapters 862 through 876) of the 2022 Reg.
Sess.); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13(a) (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Called Sess. of
the 87th Legislature); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(c); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 10; VT.
R. CRIM. P. 23(a); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 23(a); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; WIS. STAT. § 972.02(1) (2022);
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). Some states require the court to waive jury trial on agreement of the parties.
See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.260. Others require the court to agree independently. See Valega, 755 P.2d at
119.
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obtain the court’s consent.75 And one state allows no such waiver in felony
cases.76
On this backdrop, I contend that the Constitution requires that defendants
receive a unilateral right to bench trial. Specifically, defendants should have the
right to opt for a bench trial that is accompanied by a reasoned explanation of
the judges’ verdict, without requiring the consent of the prosecutor or the court.
III. THE THEORETICAL CASE
In this part, I set forth the theoretical case for recognizing a right to bench
trial. There are two components to this argument: First, certain types of juror
bias and deficiency are pervasive and thus threaten the defendant’s presumption
of innocence and right to fair trial procedures. Bench trials are the most
effective way of combating these risks. Second, certain types of juror bias and
deficiency are difficult to ascertain as an epistemic matter. Giving the defendant
the option of a bench trial is the best way to allocate the risks of mistake and
harm.
A.

Pervasive Juror Bias and Deficiency

As seen above, there are various ways potential jurors can be biased or
deficient in deliberating and rendering a decision in the case. Some of these
biases or deficiencies will impact particular jurors. Voir dire can determine some
of these prejudices so that the potential juror may be removed, though that
process is not infallible.
But even though voir dire and jury selection can uncover and remove such
overt biases, it does not take much to see that such juror biases and deficiencies
(which I collectively refer to as “juror prejudice”) need not be limited to the
peculiar experiences of particular individuals; they could instead pervade the

75. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XI; McCorquodale v. State, 211 S.E.2d 577, 581–82 (Ga. 1974)
(holding that trial court has discretion to reject defendant’s jury-trial waiver); HAW. REV. STAT. § 80661 (2022); HAW. R. PENAL P. 23(a); ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 2114 (2022); ME. R. CRIM. P. 23(a); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 263, § 6 (2022); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 19(a); MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 26.01(2)(c) (allowing defendant to waive jury trial on court finding that there is a problem
of prejudicial publicity); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 320.10 (McKinney 2022); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.001(2) (2021)
(allowing the state to waive trial by jury was held unconstitutional), invalidated by State v. Baker, 976
P.2d 1132 (Or. 1999) (en banc); State v. Dunne, 590 A.2d 1144, 1149 (N.J. 1991) (discussing New
Jersey Court Rule 1:8-1(a) and requiring the court to approve the request for waiver of jury trial based
on a set of factors); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 23(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.060 (2022).
76. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1201 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2022-11
of the 2022 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). For other compilations of this information on the rules
by jurisdiction, see Kurland, supra note 17, at 321–23 nn.39–45; and Hall, supra note 17, at 1721–23
nn.5–35.
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jury pool. Above, I identified four categories of juror prejudice.77 It is possible
for each of these categories of juror prejudice to pervasively impact the jury
pool. Indeed, as I show below, these forms of prejudice do manifest—with
regularity.78 And in such cases, a trial with such a jury sitting in judgment of
the defendant would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, namely the
presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial procedures. Consider each:
(1) Pervasive bias due to the nature of the allegations or defenses could
lead to the jury failing to afford the defendant the presumption of innocence.
It could also result in the jury lowering the standard of proof from beyond a
reasonable doubt by, for example, balancing the risk of harms of potential
recidivism against the chance that the defendant is innocent.
(2) Pervasive bias due to the defendant’s reputation—for example,
regarding prior bad acts or crimes—could also fail to afford the defendant the
presumption of innocence. Furthermore, it could also result in judgments by
the jury that are not grounded in truth, but instead more prejudicial than
probative. This would then expose the defendant to a judgment based on unfair
trial procedures. With respect to demeanor, here, too, that might expose the
defendant to unfair trial procedures, as judgments made on demeanor are not
actually probative of guilt.
(3) Pervasive bias due to defendant’s race, ethnicity, religion, or other such
immutable characteristics would also clearly violate the defendant’s right to fair
trial procedures. These facts are not probative of guilt.
(4) Lastly, pervasive deficiency by the jury in following directions and
properly assessing evidence also would straightforwardly violate the defendant’s
right to fair trial procedures.
Thus, in the situation where there is pervasive juror bias or deficiency, the
defendant’s constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence or fair trial
procedures will be prima facie violated by proceeding by jury trial.
1. The Current State of the Law in Solving Pervasive Prejudice
If a defendant does not have the option of a bench trial, the way the current
law might handle a situation of pervasive juror bias or deficiency is inadequate;
it fails to safeguard the defendant’s rights. Essentially, if a court were to
77. See supra Section I.D. The four categories identified were: (1) jurors may be biased against
the defendant due to the nature of the charges and defenses; (2) jurors may be biased against the
defendant due to the reputation or demeanor of the defendant; (3) jurors may be biased against the
defendant due to immutable features of the defendant, like race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or
religion; and (4) jurors may be deficient in their abilities to follow instructions on understanding and
applying the law. Neil Vidmar introduces a similar, but distinct typology of juror prejudice: interest
prejudice, specific prejudice, generic prejudice, and conformity prejudice. See Neil Vidmar, Case Studies
of Pre- and Midtrial Prejudice in Criminal and Civil Litigation, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 76–82
(2002).
78. See infra Part IV.
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encounter pervasive juror bias or deficiency—by claim of the defendant—the
court would most likely reject the claim. As shown below, in the event that the
court plumbs further, it will (1) rest on voir dire and jury selection to solve the
problem. In very rare cases, it may (2) delay the trial. In the rarest cases, the
court may (3) investigate the jury deliberations for explicit bigotry and animus.
These are all ineffectual solutions to the problem of pervasive juror prejudice.
That is why the right to bench trial is necessary.
a.

Reliance of Voir Dire and Jury Selection—Skilling v. United States

If the court recognizes that there is a problem of juror impartiality, the
court will most likely rest on the voir dire and jury selection process. But by
assumption, the problem is pervasive, and so removing some limited number of
jurors will not cure the concern. When faced with the fact of pervasive juror
prejudice, however, courts will most likely rule that there is no such pervasive
juror prejudice in the jury. Judges will often seek to rehabilitate jurors who
express bias or deficiency by asking prospective jurors whether they can apply
the law and follow directions.79 Most prospective jurors, at least enough to fill
a jury, will often answer these questions in the positive.80 This is not necessarily
because jurors are disingenuous; they may not realize their own biases or
deficiencies.81 Regardless, the courts will then find the jurors suitable for
seating. The parties could use their peremptory challenges to strike any jurors
they have some particularized worry about, but again these peremptory
challenges will not cure pervasive bias or deficiency.
Indeed, the Supreme Court essentially blessed this approach in Skilling v.
United States.82 Skilling concerned a number of charges—including fraud,
misrepresentation, and insider trading—against Jeffrey Skilling, the former
CEO of Enron Corporation.83 Enron famously went bankrupt, and an
“investigation uncovered an elaborate conspiracy to prop up Enron’s short-run
stock prices by overstating the company’s financial well-being.”84

79. See Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror
Bias and Decision Making, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 212, 212 (2010).
80. See, e.g., David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science
Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 260 (1981) (suggesting that jurors are encouraged by many factors to provide
conforming answers to questions in voir dire).
81. The problems of unconscious bias are well known, but the Court recognized this way back in
1909. See Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) (“Bias or prejudice is such an elusive
condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and
it might exist in the mind of one (on account of his relations with one of the parties) who was quite
positive that he had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly
uninfluenced by anything but the evidence.”).
82. 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
83. Id. at 368.
84. Id.
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Prior to trial, Skilling moved to change venue, charging that “hostility
toward him in Houston, coupled with extensive pretrial publicity, had poisoned
potential jurors.”85 Skilling presented “hundreds of news reports detailing
Enron’s downfall . . . [as well as] affidavits from the experts he engaged
portraying community attitudes in Houston in comparison to other potential
venues.”86 The district court nevertheless denied the motion.87 The court
acknowledged “incidents of intemperate commentary,” but found that the press
was overall objective and thus rejected the motion, ruling that “effective voir
dire” would detect juror bias.88 After extensive voir dire, Skilling went to trial
and was convicted on a host of charges.89
Skilling appealed, raising numerous claims, including that the district
court’s denial of the change of venue was improper.90 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed.91 In so doing, the court of appeals “determined that the volume and
negative tone of media coverage generated by Enron’s collapse created a
presumption of juror prejudice,” but that the extensive and thorough voir dire
rebutted the presumption, resulting in an impartial jury.92
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and then affirmed
in part and vacated in part.93 The Court first held that, contrary to the court of
appeals, there was no presumed prejudice.94 In its reasoning, the Court pointed
to the facts that there was a large jury pool in Houston, the publicity was not
blatantly prejudicial, and there was a delay between the events and the trial.95
The Court emphasized that such presumed prejudice was reserved for
“extreme” cases.96
Then the Court held that voir dire was proper and that the resulting jury
was impartial.97 The Court acknowledged that “many [of the jurors] expressed
sympathy for victims of Enron’s bankruptcy and speculated that greed
contributed to the corporation’s collapse,” but found that “these sentiments did
not translate into animus toward Skilling” based on the fact that jurors answered

85. Id. at 369.
86. Id. at 369–70.
87. Id. at 370.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 373–75.
90. Id. at 377.
91. Id. at 375–77.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 368.
94. See id. at 381–85.
95. See id. at 382–83. The Court also pointed to the fact that the jury acquitted Skilling on some
counts. Id. at 383–84. But this fact was simply not instructive. The jury may have thought that the
prosecution had overcharged and thereby decided to reach a compromise verdict.
96. Id. at 381.
97. Id. at 385–95.
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questions saying that they could be fair.98 Skilling challenged the fact that the
district court seemed to accept the juror’s assertions at face value, but the Court
was unmoved.99
The Court’s decision in Skilling makes clear that there is little chance that
a court—at any level—would find pervasive bias or deficiency reason to halt a
jury trial and hold up a case. The Court brushed aside the very real potential
for prejudice here: information about Enron’s bankruptcy was widely
disseminated, the going story was that Enron’s demise was brought about by
corporate greed, most if not all potential jurors would have known about that
narrative, and many would have directly or indirectly been impacted financially.
Nevertheless, all of the courts took the jurors’ rote assertions that they could
adjudge the case fairly as enough to pass inspection.100
Importantly, Skilling was only looking for a change of venue. This might
lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court, and the lower courts in tow, are
even less likely to grant the more extreme remedy of halting the trial or
dismissing the case. Indeed, when such a remedy would be appropriate because
of pervasive bias, those cases are even less likely to get such a remedy since a
court is unlikely to grant a hated defendant, say, a literal “get out of jail free”
card.101 Courts are mindful of the public’s condemnation of judgments on socalled “technicalities,” and granting a defendant an acquittal because they are so
hated would count chiefly in that set.102
98. See id. at 391–92.
99. See id. at 392.
100. See id. There was a point in time where the Court was more receptive to the dangers of pretrial
publicity and prejudice. In a pair of decisions—Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), and Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)—the Court reversed convictions based on the prejudice that occurred from
pretrial publicity. See Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727; Irvin, 366 U.S. at 729. But after Skilling, those decisions
are no more than artifacts at this point. Indeed, in each of those decisions, the Court determined that
there was a way to circumvent the prejudice—the courts could have allowed for a change of venue or
delayed the case. But things are different now. With the advent of technology, there is very little news
that is entirely local. This is especially true with crimes. Moreover, we have a diminished ability, or
even an inability, to forget. Notwithstanding, in the case of Dzhokar Tsarnaev, the Court still held that
it was proper for the district court to prohibit the defense from asking jurors about their pretrial
exposure to media coverage of the bombings. See supra note 2.
101. See Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of Substantive Due Process: A Tale of Two
Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453, 486 (1997) (describing the public’s disposition against
“technicalities” that result in acquittals); Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third
Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1326 (2005) (explaining that in “protections like the exclusionary
rule, where the stricter the protection is perceived as being, the greater the chance that the public will
think acquittals are due to ‘technicalities’”); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms:
Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1352 (2010) (observing that
elected judges are responsive to public opinion).
102. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 585, 657 (2011) (“[J]udges often appear to be uncomfortable applying the rule, particularly for
minor violations of police procedure, and especially in the case of more serious crimes. Judges are
reluctant to free, or be seen to free, seemingly guilty defendants, so they manipulate the jurisprudence
so as to avoid exclusion.”); Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111,
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Delaying Trial and the Anathema of Right to Speedy Trial Remedies

In the rare event that the court recognizes that there is pervasive prejudice
in the jury pool, the best the defendant could hope for is that the court simply
delays the trial. The animating idea is that certain types of bias or deficiency
may subside with the passage of time.
That may work in some cases, but it will be unlikely to work in others. For
example, in many cases of bias or deficiency, delay is unlikely to be effective.
Consider each category of bias. The passage of time is unlikely to erode bias
due to the nature of the charges—which the jury will obviously viscerally learn
about through the trial. It is similarly unlikely to erode bias related to bigotry,
unless there are large changes in society. And it is unlikely to diminish
deficiencies of the jury in assessing evidence—those are often longstanding and
related to certain kinds of cognitive deficits in people that are obdurate.
The one kind of bias that might subside is that related to the defendant’s
reputation. Delay might allow people to forget about the defendant, with any
media sensationalism being replaced by the next story. But that may be a dated
possibility: in a world of social media, it is hard for the defendant to be
forgotten. Moreover, the trial itself might serve as a trigger for jurors to
remember the defendant, reigniting the possibility of bias. Thus, delay is
unlikely to actually benefit the defendant. Instead, it will likely result in the
defendant having a potentially endless delay for trial or require the defendant
to sacrifice the right to a fair trial.
Additionally, as a formal matter, there is a limit to the amount of time that
the court may delay the trial, due to the defendant’s right to speedy trial. The
right to speedy trial ensures that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”103 The Supreme Court has
refused to define a specific time period after which the defendant’s right to
speedy trial is violated,104 but the Court has made clear that when the right is
violated, dismissal is the only proper remedy.105 This may seem like a welcome

112 (2003). One might ask why, then, we should trust judges to oversee bench trials and potentially
grant acquittals. One reason is that acquittals for lack of evidence are not judgments on technicalities.
There is still a reverence for “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” that is unlike “no trial because the
defendant is too despised.” I discuss this further at infra note 168 and accompanying text.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
104. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) (“The first suggestion is that we hold that the
Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period . . . . But
such a result would require this Court to engage in legislative or rulemaking activity, rather than in the
adjudicative process to which we should confine our efforts. We do not establish procedural rules for
the States, except when mandated by the Constitution. We find no constitutional basis for holding that
the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.”).
105. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (“The remedy for a violation of this
constitutional right has traditionally been the dismissal of the indictment or the vacation of the
sentence.”).
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result for the defendant. If pervasive juror bias or deficiency would require
delay of the trial, and the defendant’s right to speedy trial limits the amount of
that delay, that might mean that the case must be dismissed against the
defendant. Indeed, Jon Fieldman, in an excellent student comment,106 made a
similar point with respect to the case Singer v. United States.107
Singer involved a defendant charged with thirty infractions of the mail
fraud statute, and he allegedly “used the mails to dupe amateur songwriters into
sending him money for the marketing of their songs.”108 He sought a bench trial
to shorten the proceedings, and, although the court was willing, the government
refused to consent.109 The defendant was tried by jury and convicted on twentynine of the thirty counts.110 Thereafter the defendant appealed, claiming that he
had a right to bench trial.111 The Court ultimately denied that defendants have
such a unilateral right.112 However, the Court held open the possibility that
there may be a case “where a defendant’s reasons for wanting to be tried by a
judge alone are so compelling that the Government’s insistence on trial by jury
would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial.”113 Fieldman
argued that this open possibility was actually a nullity.114 If there were
circumstances that would impinge on the defendant’s impartial trial right, and
the presiding court recognized this impingement, then the defendant would not
opt for a bench trial.115 Instead, the defendant could insist on satisfaction of their
jury trial right, and because that is not possible, the only remedy would be
dismissal.116 Thus, the option of bench trial would never arise, because the
defendant would rather obtain a dismissal than a bench trial.117
Though perhaps formally compelling, this argument overlooks the ground
realities. It is the very severe nature of this remedy that makes it practically
unlikely. The remedy here is dismissal with prejudice, the equivalent of an
acquittal for the defendant. But it is highly unlikely that the presiding court will
grant the defendant an acquittal in such a scenario. To see this, consider the
Court’s actual interpretation of the right to speedy trial. In Barker v. Wingo,118
106. Fieldman, supra note 17, at 224.
107. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 25–26.
112. Id. at 34–35, 38.
113. Id. at 37–38 (“Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where ‘passion,
prejudice[,] . . . public feeling’ or some other factor may render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial
by jury.” (citation omitted)).
114. See Fieldman, supra note 17, at 232.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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the Court eschewed any rigid time periods in which the defendant must be tried
after being charged.119 Instead, the Court set forth a four-factor test that
considers “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion
of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”120 In Barker itself, the Court found
that a five-year delay did not trigger the right to speedy trial to require
dismissal.121 In general, the Court’s jurisprudence has resulted in a cabined right
to speedy trial.122 Courts have very rarely granted a dismissal based on a
violation of the defendant’s right to speedy trial.123 Indeed, courts have found
the extreme nature of the remedy itself a deterrence to granting it.124
However, without courts granting the right to speedy trial remedy, even
if courts were to recognize pervasive jury bias or deficiency, the result would
simply be that the defendant’s trial is held in abeyance. Though this may be
preferable for some defendants, it will not be for many. The defendant is simply
held in jeopardy—and, indeed, if the crime is serious, the defendant may remain
detained.125 That is not an adequate remedy for the defendant, and it simply
does not safeguard the defendant’s rights. Rather, it requires the defendant to
make a severe concession—remain under the sword of Damocles and perhaps
detained—in order to potentially safeguard their right to a fair trial.
119. See id. at 523.
120. Id. at 523, 530.
121. See id. at 533–36.
122. See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, Speedy Trial Swift Justice: Full-Fledged Right or “Second-Class Citizen?”,
21 SW. U. L. REV. 31, 34 (1992) (arguing that the right to speedy trial has a second-class status and is
difficult to assert effectively); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27
STAN. L. REV. 525, 525 (1975) (“In a quite literal sense, the sixth amendment right to speedy trial has
today become . . . more honored in the breach than the observance.”).
123. United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 2016) (observing that speedy trial violations
are “rare”).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Operating in a field
where the only possible remedy is ‘the draconian remedy of dismissal of the indictment,’ we have been
reluctant to find that an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated absent a credible showing
that he has been substantially prejudiced by the delay.” (citation omitted)); State v. Alfred, 337 So. 2d
1049, 1057 (La. 1976) (“The amorphous quality of the right to a speedy trial leads to the unsatisfactorily
severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived. This is indeed a serious
consequence because, unlike the exclusionary rule or the reversal for a new trial, it means that a
defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime, or two as in this case, will go free without having been
tried. Overzealous application of this remedy would infringe ‘the societal interest in trying people
accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error . . . .’” (quoting United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966))); see also Amsterdam, supra note 122, at 543 (“Some would
no doubt argue that the dismissal sanction upon which the Supreme Court has concentrated all of its
attention is a more effective monitory device, because it threatens what state courts and prosecutors
fear most. I would perhaps agree if there were any prospect that the dismissal sanction would be
rigorously enforced to this end. But the lesson of the present sorry state of sixth amendment law is
precisely that dismissal as a remedy has the sole effect of making judges almost universally prefer the
disease.”).
125. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV.
187, 213 (2017) (stating that some “statutes authorize pretrial detention for particular types of serious
crimes”).
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Challenging Jury Deliberations Infected by Bigotry and Animus

A final long-shot possibility is for the defendant to challenge a guilty
verdict based on the fact that the jury’s verdict was grounded in improper bias
or deficiency, as demonstrated through their deliberations.
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,126 the defendant was charged with
harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted sexual assault on a child.127
The defendant was convicted of the first two charges, but the jury deadlocked
on the third.128 After the jury was discharged, two jurors informed defense
counsel that one juror had made derogatory remarks against Hispanics during
the deliberations.129 Defense counsel then made a motion for a new trial, based
on the affidavits of the informing jurors.130 The trial court denied the motion
based on the state “no-impeachment” rule that protected jury deliberations from
examination.131 The case was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals and
Colorado Supreme Court before arriving to the U.S. Supreme Court.132 The
Court reversed, holding that
where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on
racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to
permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement
and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.133
But the Court cautioned that
[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will
justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial
inquiry. For the inquiry to proceed, there must be a showing that one or
more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and
resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial
animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to
convict.134
Pena-Rodriguez is a decision to celebrate, for to let such a verdict stand in
the face of perverse juror conduct would have been unconscionable. Yet it is
clear that Pena-Rodriguez will aid a vanishingly small number of defendants,

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862.
See id.
Id. at 862–63.
Id. at 869.
Id.
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even where pervasive juror prejudice is a problem. First, most conscious juror
prejudice is not made explicit—most racists will not use slurs in public among
strangers. Second, even if made explicit, many jurors will not report this
conduct to defense counsel or the prosecution.135 Third, much of juror prejudice
is unconscious. Fourth, it is not clear that Pena-Rodriguez touches forms of juror
prejudice that are not bigotry or direct animus.136 Thus, this is not a true
solution to the problem of pervasive juror prejudice.
In sum, when bench trials are not an option, the current state of the law
offers very little to combat pervasive juror prejudice. In most cases, courts will
simply ignore the prejudice, or hope that voir dire and jury selection will cure
the harm. In the rare event that they do recognize pervasive juror prejudice,
courts may at best delay the trial. But the purported solution of delay is highly
ineffectual for the defendant. Finally, a defendant has a prayer of a claim in
plumbing juror deliberations, but that will not uproot most forms of juror
prejudice.
2. The Right to Bench Trial and Pervasive Prejudice
I contend the problem of pervasive juror prejudice can be greatly mitigated
by ensuring that defendants have a right to bench trial. In particular, a bench
trial can ensure that the defendant obtains a fairer trial, with a factfinder who
is impartial or at least more accountable. Importantly, it does not require any
delay in proceedings in order to preserve their right to a fair trial. Furthermore,
recognizing the right to bench trial—in giving the defendant the option—does
no harm to the status quo.
As an initial point, the right to bench trial will not preserve the defendant’s
right to a trial by impartial jury. Where there is pervasive juror prejudice, there
is no right to trial by impartial jury left to preserve (because when there is such
pervasive juror prejudice, the very problem is that we cannot obtain a fair and
impartial jury). Every solution is seeking the second best—to preserve the
rights to a fair trial, without impingement of any other rights, including of other
parties.
With that in mind, first begin with the fact that the right to bench trial
better preserves the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The basic idea here is that
the jury—which is impacted by pervasive bias or deficiency—can be replaced
with a judge—who is presumably not. Generally, there is a strong intuition that
135. See Daniel S. Harawa, Sacrificing Secrecy, 55 GA. L. REV. 593, 634 (2021) (discussing the
difficulty in discovering juror bias).
136. Worryingly, there is reason to think that the Court’s holding may not reach other forms of
bigotry, like anti-homosexual bigotry. See Mark Joseph Stern, A Jury Likely Sentenced a Man to Death
Because He’s Gay. The Supreme Court Just Let Its Verdict Stand., SLATE (June 18, 2018,
4:24 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/rhines-v-south-dakota-supreme-court-refusesto-hear-case-about-anti-gay-jury.html [https://perma.cc/HK28-B47S (dark archive)].
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judges, who have been educated in the law and have been selected, either by
nomination and confirmation procedures or through elections, will be
significantly more likely to set aside bias and will not be deficient in their
application of the law.137 At least with respect to applying the law to facts
properly, it does seem very likely that judges are better than juries. Indeed, one
empirical study by Reid Hastie and W. Kip Viscusi concluded that judges are
“better able to deal with risk judgments made in hindsight than were the
citizens.”138 And in an article comparing jury trials to bench trials, Uzi Segal and
Alex Stein found that there were higher acquittal rates in bench trials than in
jury trials.139 They explained that this was due to defendants opting for bench
trials in cases where the underlying evidence favored them, because judges were
more consistent than juries in their application of the law to facts due to a host
of systemic incentives.140 If it is right that judges are better able to set aside bias
and less susceptible to deficiencies, then moving to a bench trial—with the more
apt judge as factfinder—can mitigate the harms of pervasive juror prejudice.
Perhaps a “big if.” There certainly is reason to think that judges are not
much better than juries, especially when it comes to bias.141 After all, judges are
human, and many of these biases are, as discussed, unconscious and implicit.
Some judges may be educated about this and thus reflective enough to identify
these biases and counteract them. Others may not. Indeed, there is substantial

137. See Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 504 n.75 (1975) (stating that “because of the generally
careful selection process, federal judges are likely to be highly experienced, intelligent individuals
steeped in traditions of the law,” and “[t]hus, it is probable that at least in most cases judges will be
better able to control their prejudices than will jurors”); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American
Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1510 (2003) (stating “judges are likely to exhibit less bias in their
decisionmaking than juries,” because “[a] judge, either in a ruling on summary judgment or at the
conclusion of a bench trial, presumably seeks to prevent personal prejudice and bias from swaying
decisionmaking”).
138. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk
Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 916 (1998). This case concerned civil cases, but there is good reason to
think the relative abilities to analyze law would similarly apply in criminal cases as well.
139. Segal et al., supra note 17, at 1500, 1504.
140. See id. at 1500, 1504–05 (discussing systemic incentives like “evenhandedness,
professionalism, . . . an unqualified commitment to the institutionally affirmed reasons for decisions,”
and predictability). This may require using separate judges for pretrial matters from the trial itself, to
avoid prejudicing the bench trial judge. Many federal judges already use magistrate judges for
potentially prejudicial pretrial issues.
141. See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 49 (1994) (“Judicial bias does
exist; where it exists unidentified and untempered by the judge or by an attorney via recusal
mechanisms, the bias of a judge can negatively impact the outcome of a trial or other judicial
proceedings.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225–26 (2009) (arguing
that judges are affected by implicit bias but can overcome it with sufficient motivation and proper
mechanisms).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1621 (2022)

1650

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

empirical evidence suggesting that judges are worryingly susceptible to bias,
and at the same level as juries.142
This is where a common feature of bench trials, that they be accompanied
with a reasoned opinion,143 may make a substantial difference in mitigating the
problem of pervasive fact-finder prejudice. A reasoned opinion can help ensure
that the verdict is not reached due to bias, but rather is rationally supported.144
In a criminal case, a reasoned opinion must explain how the evidence shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime (and
satisfied each of the elements).145 The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is a
high threshold.146 Requiring the court to state its reasons for why the standard
is met—why there is no plausible explanation of innocence or why there is not
a small percentage chance that the defendant is innocent—is exacting. The
court’s analysis is transparent, for both the defendant’s and public’s
examination. Thus, in explaining its reasoning, the court cannot appeal to the
sources of bias—like facts about the defendant’s prior acts, reputation,
courtroom demeanor, or immutable characteristics—because those are not types
of admissible or probative evidence. This can effectively combat overt bias and
deficiency infecting the judgment.147 And if the court’s explanation fails in these
regards, it is subject to examination on appeal and audit by the public (and
perhaps by other decision makers).148
Beyond prejudice, a bench trial also requires no delay. If the defendant is
allowed to choose a bench trial, that can be accomplished in less time than a jury
142. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 68–70 (2017); James R. SteinerDillon, Epistemic Exceptionalism, 52 IND. L. REV. 207, 208–10 (2019).
143. See supra Part II.
144. See Redish, supra note 137, at 504 n.75 (noting the requirement that judges’ factual findings
must be made explicitly makes their verdicts more susceptible to judicial review); Moore, supra note
137, at 1510 (noting that judges’ decisions are more easily scrutinized in light of more transparent
disclosures of findings of fact and conclusions of law); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew
J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35–42 (2007)
(showing that judging is often intuitive, and thus susceptible to bias, but that this bias can be mitigated
by training, prompting, and opinion writing). Observe that we can require a reasoned opinion of bench
trials, but likely cannot do so for jury trials. Jurors may not be able to write opinions explaining their
reasoning, individually or collectively, and imposing such a requirement may improperly (and illegally)
skew the makeup of the jury.
145. See Abhi Raghunathan, Note, “Nothing Else but Mad”: The Hidden Costs of Preventive Detention,
100 GEO. L.J. 967, 968–69 (2012) (“In traditional criminal law, the state must prove all elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction and deprive an individual’s liberty.” (citing In
re Winship, 397 U.S 358, 364 (1970))). A reasoned opinion would explain how each of these elements
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
146. Pepson et al., supra note 52, at 1194.
147. See Guthrie et al., supra note 144, at 36–38 (explaining how requiring written opinions can
mitigate judicial bias).
148. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 141, at 1226 (discussing institutional mechanisms and reforms,
including auditing, that can help judges avoid succumbing to bias).
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trial, since a bench trial does not require the time-consuming voir dire. If
accompanied by a reasoned opinion, that may take some time to produce, but
judges can generally produce that in short order (or we can require it of them).
Indeed, bench trials are generally considered more efficient than jury trials, in
terms of judicial resources.149
Importantly, recognizing the defendant’s right to bench trial does nothing
to impact any other rights the defendant might have. That is simply because it
is an option for the defendant. If the defendant does not want a bench trial, then
the defendant can continue to jury trial—as is the defendant’s constitutional
right—and the status quo remains unaltered. The only adverse possibility is that
the optionality of a bench trial will cause courts to be less likely to recognize
and hold that there is pervasive juror prejudice. But as we saw,150 courts are
already highly unlikely to recognize any pervasive juror prejudice—so it is
unlikely that defendants will be disadvantaged in this way.151
Now, the option of a bench trial, even with the requirement of reasoned
opinion, is no panacea for the problem of pervasive factfinder bias. As discussed,
judges may be impacted by the same pervasive biases that can strike jurors. I
have argued the requirement of reasoned opinion may mitigate the effect of
such bias to a great extent. But there are subtle, implicit ways in which bias can
impact the judge, and the requirement of writing a reasoned opinion may not
eject those biases from impacting the determination. For example, suppose a
judge renders a decision of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the opinion,
the judge explains that some of the defendant’s proffered theories of innocence
were implausible or highly unlikely. At some point, the judge’s analysis may do
little else than assert that in the judge’s estimation—based on their experience
and understanding of the world—that such possibilities are implausible or
highly unlikely. It is here that bias may creep in, impacting why the judge
believes such possibilities are implausible or highly unlikely. There is very little
to do about that; because it is part of our human experience, it is part of our

149. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1050–
67 (1984) (arguing that widespread use of bench trials can be as efficient as a system that uses pleas);
Matthew L. Zabel, Advisory Juries and Their Use and Misuse in Federal Tort Claims Act Cases, 2003 BYU
L. REV. 185, 209 (“In contrast to a jury trial, a bench trial can be a remarkably more efficient means of
conducting a trial.”).
150. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
151. One other potential concern is that providing a defendant with this unilateral option for a
bench trial will serve to the defendant’s detriment, as they can more easily be strong armed—by judge
or prosecutor—into waiving their right to jury trial. This is implausible. As it is, defendants can opt
for bench trial with the consent of the judge or prosecutor. So, these actors can already strong arm the
defendant into waiving jury trial. Unilateral bench trial does not make this more likely. Regardless,
such strong arming is a constitutional violation, and we should vigilantly prevent it. Moreover, if this
is a truly intractable concern, we could impose a requirement that jury determination of guilt and judge
determination of guilt be jointly required to convict.
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system.152 Nevertheless, in some cases, properly constructed and conducted
bench trials can go far—and further than jury trials—in mitigating the harms
from bias. Defendants should have that choice.
B.

The Epistemic Problems of Juror Prejudice

One might inquire whether pervasive juror prejudice is actually a problem
that requires our attention. I have pointed to reasons to think that it is possible,
and below I make the case that the problem of pervasive juror prejudice is
widespread.153 But the problem has rarely, if ever, been recognized by any court.
So, the skeptic’s doubts may persist. As I will show, I think the empirical and
historical evidence pellucidly show that it is a problem. But there is also a
theoretical answer. Here I explain (1) the two main epistemic problems and (2)
how the resulting epistemic risk should be allocated, showing that the option of
a bench trial is optimal.
1. Epistemic Uncertainty
There are at least two sources of epistemic uncertainty about juror
prejudice. The first problem occurs at a fundamental level and points to a
concern observed earlier.154 How do we know whether particular dispositions
that jurors may have constitute impermissible bias or deficiency, rather than
permissible beliefs or abilities that are part of a diverse body of jurors?
But suppose that there is a set of identifiable biases or deficiencies of juries,
for which there is a consensus that they are impermissible. Even still, there is a
second problem: How do we know that jurors have these biases or deficiencies
and that they will impact their ability to fairly adjudge a defendant’s case? These
are difficult questions, and there is no uncontroversial answer to either.
Part and parcel of a jury trial is that there are multiple decision makers,
each independently assessing the case. Juries do deliberate, but each juror is in
control of their own vote. And in adjudging the case and casting their vote, each
juror will be informed by their education, their reasoning, and their life
experience. This is generally considered a benefit of the system in ensuring the
truth function of the jury.
However, there is a line between acceptable life experience and inapt bias
or deficiency. Not controversially, bigotry and personal knowledge about the
defendant or the prosecution are not permissible.155 On the other hand, a juror’s

152. See infra Section III.B (discussing how providing the defendant with the unilateral right to
bench trial allows the defendant to manage the relative risks of juror and judge bias).
153. See infra Part IV.
154. See supra Part I.
155. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (“Permitting racial prejudice in the
jury system damages ‘both the fact and the perception’ of the jury’s role as ‘a vital check against the
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knowledge about case subject matter—say, financial transactions or gun
trajectories—that aids them in understanding facts about the crime are
permissible.156 Those examples are easy enough, but gray areas persist.
For example, suppose a juror is making credibility determinations about
witnesses. In so doing, the juror appeals to their life experiences with people
who tell the truth and lie. Informed by their life experiences, the juror
determines that a person is lying because the witness was sweating, had certain
facial tics, and made quick hand gestures. Is that permissible?
At first glance, this seems appropriate, and courts generally entrust jurors
with the task of making exactly these kinds of determinations.157 However, on
further inspection, some of these assumptions about human behavior may be
based on facts about the witness’s anxious demeanor that have nothing to do
with the truth of the witness’s statements. For example, the assumptions may
be ableist, privileging certain kinds of abilities that the witness does not have
but are also not related to their truth telling. Indeed, the assumptions may also
implicate deeply embedded cultural, ethnic, and racial biases. Or they may
not—all of this may remain within rational faculties to determine credibility.
Determining the permissibility of juror biases is a genuinely difficult issue;
there is no obvious answer. And these questions are not rare: they arise any time
the parties and the court are required to assess factfinders for trial.
Consequently, there is substantial epistemic uncertainty about what qualifies as
impermissible juror prejudice.
Furthermore, even with a definitive set of impermissible juror biases or
deficiencies, there would still be great epistemic uncertainty about whether
particular jurors exhibit them. Through the course of voir dire, some jurors may
reveal that they do have impermissible biases or deficiencies; perhaps they
admit that they are racist, or that they dislike the defendant, or that they have
difficulty keeping attention. But of course, if there is a seated jury then there
will be a sufficient number of jurors who do not so admit and whom the court
deemed acceptable.158 Yet we can still ask whether the jurors have these
impermissible biases or deficiencies. Jurors may lie about their biases.
Specifically, if jurors are motivated by animus, either against the individual
defendant or due to bigotry, then they may seek to hide that animus so that
they can make it on to the jury and vote to convict the defendant. Or jurors

wrongful exercise of power by the State.’” (citations omitted)); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 6 EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1800 (4th ed. 2022) (discussing personal knowledge).
156. Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional
Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 351 (1980).
157. E.g., United States v. Muthana, 60 F.3d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Assessing a witness’[s]
credibility ‘is a matter inherently within the province of the jury.’” (citation omitted)).
158. See Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL &
ETHNIC JUST. 165, 187–89 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of uncovering bias in voir dire).
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may be in denial or embarrassed to admit publicly that they have a particular
animus. Even when jurors are not being deliberately disingenuous or
circumventive, they may be mistaken about their unconscious biases or
deficiencies in assessing evidence of which they are themselves unaware.159
Thus, there are numerous reasons to be uncertain whether jurors are in fact
impacted by impermissible prejudice, whether in the form of bias or deficiency.
Combined with the uncertainty about what constitutes impermissible prejudice,
there is an epistemic deficit with respect to whether jurors are appropriate to
serve as adjudicators.
2. Allocating Epistemic Risk
If there is impermissible prejudice that informs some juror’s judgment in
a jury trial, then a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights will occur.
If jury trial is mandated, the only choice to avoid the constitutional violation is
not to hold the trial, either by delay or dismissal. But courts are highly unlikely
to adopt these extreme remedies. Moreover, there is no doubt that pervasive
juror prejudice will infect some trials. Thus, there will likely be some number
of constitutional violations, with no practical solution.
As I contended above, this Gordian knot can be loosened by utilizing
bench trials. Now, given the epistemic uncertainty of whether there is such bias
or deficiency, who is best tasked with deciding whether there should be a bench
trial: The prosecutor, the court, or the defendant?
I contend it is best to allocate this epistemic risk solely to the defendant.
Because the defendant has a right to a jury trial, to hold a bench trial, the
defendant must opt to have a bench trial. Thus, the functional question is
whether the prosecutor or the court should also get input in this decision—in
the form of a veto.
Prosecutors. The prosecutor is a bad choice to assess juror prejudice. The
prosecutor is adverse to the defendant, and in this situation the prosecutor is
trying to obtain a conviction against the defendant. Thus, prejudice that would
disfavor the defendant would likely favor the prosecution in trial.160 Ideally, a
prosecutor would be able to set that aside, because, as prosecutors will often tell
you, they are supposed to seek justice, not convictions.161 But defendants have
the right to their own counsel for a reason—to safeguard their own rights. It

159. Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 505–
21 (1965) (challenging the efficacy of voir dire based on the fact that jurors lie, subconsciously and
consciously).
160. This is under a binary understanding of the trial outcome.
161. Kenneth Bresler, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541–42 (1996) (observing that “[t]he most notable and noble principle of
prosecution directs prosecutors to seek justice, not convictions” and providing numerous citations).
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would be poor design to rely on the prosecutor to balance the defendant’s right
to a fair trial and the objective of convicting the defendant.162
Prosecutors may determine that, on balance, it is more just to convict a
defendant than to safeguard their rights. Or prosecutors may be susceptible to
motivated reasoning, either rationalized or unconscious.163 This is especially the
case when there is epistemic uncertainty and the question of whether there is
impermissible prejudice can be plausibly answered either way. And even if the
prosecutor acts perfectly with the defendant’s fair-trial rights in mind, there
may still be a problem of appearance, wherein the defendant and public question
whether the prosecutor did in fact do so.
Courts. Certainly, the court is generally an appropriate actor in considering
safeguards for the defendant’s rights. But here the court may be pulled in
different directions that may impact its judgment. First, the court may have an
incentive for the criminal case to proceed via jury trial. A jury trial allows the
court to “dodge” making judgments themselves by punting the result to the
jury, thereby avoiding scrutiny and blame for the results.164 Moreover, insofar
as the court is vested with an independent judgment as to whether a bench trial
is warranted,165 the court would need to affirm that there was pervasive juror
bias or deficiency in the jury pool—that is, the general citizenry. But judges are
political actors—many state-court judges are elected and even federal judges,
with life tenure, may feel political pressures.166 On that backdrop, judges may
be hesitant to make such an assertion, because of its potential political toll.167
Moreover, if the court makes this assertion, then the defendant might insist on
a jury trial, which would then put the court in the bind of having to halt trial.168

162. Indeed, our experience with peremptory challenges in voir dire demonstrates that we cannot
simply trust prosecutors to safeguard the rights of defendants to a fair trial. That has necessitated Batson
challenges. See infra Section V.B.
163. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 805, 814–15 (2012) (finding that prosecutors are
susceptible to unconscious and implicit bias in every stage of decision-making, including pretrial
strategic choices).
164. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study,
57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 941 (2004) (suggesting that judges prefer jury sentencing because it allows
them to “dodge” criticism).
165. It may be the case that the court is simply required to approve the defendant’s request for a
bench trial. If so, the defendant is the actual decision maker on whether there is a bench trial—which
is equivalent to the proposal I proffer as best.
166. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and
American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1352 (2010).
167. Indeed, courts feel these hesitancies in granting Batson challenges, for fear of labeling
attorneys, and especially government attorneys, bigots, or liars. Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating
Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (2014). They could reasonably feel
similarly hesitant in labeling members of the public liars or bigots.
168. That is, if the court determines that the jury is sufficiently infected with prejudice that a
bench trial is required, then, in light of that finding, the defendant may revoke the request for bench
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As we saw before, this would be an extreme remedy that the court is unlikely to
embrace. Thus, this may result in the court denying claims of juror prejudice
when there are good reasons to believe that explicit or implicit biases will
disfavor the defendant.169
The Defendant. The defendant is generally not torn about protecting their
own rights—that will be among the defendant’s primary concerns. So, the
defendant can be trusted to assess this risk properly, because it is the defendant’s
neck that is on the line.
Moreover, giving the defendant this choice will not frustrate the pursuit
of justice. This is not akin, for example, to seeking the defendant’s permission
to be put on trial at all. Whether under a bench trial or a jury trial, the defendant
will be criminally tried. Neither would this spell a death knell for jury trial. Jury
trial has certain advantages over bench trial that may favor a defendant. For
example, if a defendant is averse to convictions, as many are, then the fact that
a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict of jurors voting for guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt may often favor the defendant.170 In contrast, a bench trial
often requires only one factfinder—the judge—to determine whether the
defendant is guilty.171 If the defendant is equally concerned about bias or
trial and demand an impartial jury trial—which in turn is an impossibility given the court’s finding on
jury prejudice. I discuss this further infra Section V.C (under Alternative Solutions).
169. One might query whether this objection to courts also impugns the efficacy of bench trials. I
do not think it does. First, I contend there is a substantial difference between adjudging whether jurors
are adequate and whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The former imposes
pressures on the court—such as the ability to dodge, avoiding impugning the public, and avoiding
halting or delaying the proceedings. The latter does not—finding that the evidence does not show guilt
is simply not as controversial for the court (and the blame is shared with the prosecution). Second,
with proper institutional and auditing mechanisms, we may be able to better judicial determinations—
both on juror competence and on guilt. I think such judicial reforms are easier to impose in the ultimate
question of guilt, as it is not under the same pressures as the juror competence inquiry. Furthermore,
such reforms are better utilized on substantive questions of guilt, because there is little cost in affording
defendants bench trials if they so choose. We do not need to save the structure of prosecutor/court veto
of bench trials.
170. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020).
171. Because of the requirement of unanimity, if the judge and jurors are equivalent adjudicators,
it should be substantially more difficult to obtain a guilty verdict from a jury of twelve than from one
judge. For example, if jurors were acting independently, and they each had a 95% likelihood of
convicting, there would be a 54% chance of obtaining a unanimous guilty verdict. Of course, juries do
not act independently, but neither do they act in complete uniformity, and so the likelihood of
conviction can be estimated to be greater than 54% but strictly less than 95%. In comparison, in a bench
trial, if a judge has a 95% (or X%) likelihood of convicting, then there is a 95% (or X%) chance of
conviction. Thus, whether a defendant should rationally opt for a bench trial will depend on the jury’s
prior proclivity to convict, compared to a judge’s. It could be that the jury’s likelihood is, due to bias,
substantially greater than a judge’s, which in turn may rationally justify opting for a bench trial. For
example, suppose a judge has an 80% likelihood of convicting. And suppose, due to bias, jurors have a
95% chance of convicting and that there are really just two important voices in the jury box—with all
the other jurors following in tow. In such a case, the jury has a 90% chance of convicting. That is
significant and would rationally justify the defendant opting for a bench trial.
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deficiency on the part of the judge, and that the requirement of reasoned
opinion will not rectify that concern, then opting for a jury trial may still be
best.
On the other hand, if every defendant thinks that juries are regularly
tainted by pervasive bias such that bench trials are preferable, that might result
in a paucity of jury trials. I submit that this is an acceptable, if not favorable,
result. Moreover, there is already a paucity of jury trials, given the prominence
of plea bargaining,172 so this would not significantly change the status quo.
Again, this does no harm to the defendant’s rights. Because it remains an option
for the defendant, if the defendant wishes to pursue their rights to challenge
the seating of the jury due to pervasive bias or deficiency and insist on a jury
trial, the defendant is free to do so. The option of a bench trial does not formally
or practically impact that right.173
C.

Further Objections

We now consider some pressing objections to the theoretical case. First,
given the pervasiveness of bias, including with judges, and the nature of
appellate review, does the bench trial offer any actual benefit over jury trials?
Second, if we understand the jury trial as having societal benefits separate from
protecting the defendant, does the option of bench trial improperly curb that
benefit?
1. The Impact of Bench Trials
The first question is whether the optionality of bench trial will have any
material impact. The idea is that judges, too, are impacted by bias and so
decisions from the trial court will also be biased. In particular, even if there is a
reasoned opinion supporting the decision, appellate review—employing the
sufficiency of the evidence standard—is deferential and permissive. Thus, the
bench trial does little to ameliorate the problem.
There is a deep, unfortunate truth here: if such bias is truly pervasive
among judges, with the power to blind, then bench trials with reasoned opinions
will do little work. But we have reason to think that the level of bias in the
judiciary is not so blinding. That is, I contend that generally judges can
determine whether an opinion fails to support properly the claim that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the requirement of a
bench trial with a reasoned opinion can make a significant difference. It can
expose, for the reviewing court and indeed the factfinding judge themselves,
172. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 1237, 1238 (2008) (reporting that more than 95% of all state and federal felony convictions are
obtained by guilty pleas).
173. See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
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whether bias or deficiency is afoot. Moreover, insofar as such bias persists,
tackling that problem requires institutional reforms, auditing mechanisms, and
pressing appellate review.174
The possibility of error will persist. If a fact-finding judge produces a
wholly biased or deficient opinion, then the reviewing court will have to
undertake the analysis themselves. They may affirm, examining for the
sufficiency of the evidence. That review is essentially the same as when a
reviewing court examines a jury’s verdict. In such a case, a bench trial may offer
no improvement over a jury trial.
Again, however, I contend our system is better equipped to fix problems
with the judiciary than with the entire jury pool. Implementing judicial
selection, judge training, and audit or review mechanisms will substantially
mitigate bias.175 Whereas eradicating bias in the jury pool—that is, the
citizenry—is considerably more difficult.176 Continuing that huge project is
important, but offering the defendant the option of bench trial, with a reformed
judiciary, can safeguard defendants’ rights in the interim.
This is not merely a response to an objection. I wholeheartedly agree that
reforms are necessary to make bench trials—and the judiciary—more effective
in combating bias, and such reforms are part of my overarching proposal. No
doubt, we must press systemic maintenance of and reforms to the judiciary.
That said, the perfect should not be the enemy of the good. The fact that the

174. Rachlinski et al., supra note 141, at 1226 (discussing institutional mechanisms and reforms,
including auditing, that can help judges avoid succumbing to bias); Guthrie et al., supra note 144, at
35–42 (explaining various reforms to mitigate judicial bias). Appellate review here is often deferential,
just as with juries. United States v. Medina, 969 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2020); Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on other grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1996)). But even still, the reviewing court must explain how the evidence would permit a rational trier
of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike with jury trials, if there is a
bench trial, the reviewing court will not be working on a blank slate—it will have a reasoned opinion
from the fact-finding judge. If the fact-finding judge’s verdict is a product of bias or deficiency, that
should be more transparent for the reviewing court. This, I contend, will result in better
determinations. Moreover, though not my focus here, I suggest changing the level of deference issued
to bench trial judgments. Additionally, we should also think deeply about elected judges and their
propriety for criminal adjudications. Political pressures may push judges to be “tough on crime,” and
thus compromise fair trials. Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State
Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2006); Amanda
Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 793 (2010)
(stating “[m]ajoritarian pressures on elected judges are at their apex in criminal cases”); DANIEL R.
PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY
99 (1995) (finding that appointed judges are more likely to favor criminal defendants than elected
judges).
175. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 141, at 1226; Guthrie et al., supra note 144, at 35–42.
176. To be clear, it is more difficult to implement these reforms citizenry-wide, simply because
there are more citizens than judges.
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optionality of bench trials may allow some defendants to avoid juror prejudice,
where no practical solution otherwise occurs, is enough to demand it now.
2. The Other Societal Benefits of Jury Trial
The crux of this objection is to challenge the assumption that the jury’s
purpose is to afford protections for the defendant. Instead, the argument is that
the jury serves other societal benefits, including principally allowing
community representation in the criminal process, whether for the benefit of
the defendant or not. If these other societal benefits exist, then providing the
defendant with the option of avoiding the jury will potentially negate these
societal benefits.
As an initial matter, I maintain that the jury’s purpose is principally as a
shield for the defendant.177 Even if there are other benefits to the jury, such as
community representation, those benefits are lexically inferior to the interests
of protecting the defendant’s due process rights. Thus, if bench trial optionality
enhances the defendant’s rights to a fair trial, then that must trump any ancillary
benefits of a jury trial.
Even assuming that there is an interest in community representation
served by a jury trial that must be balanced against the defendant’s fair trial
rights, our system has already shown that it has little space or regard for that
interest. The vast majority of cases in both the federal and state systems are
resolved by pleas—which do not afford any room for juries.178 Given the lack of
community representation through juries in most all criminal cases, even if the
right to bench trial reduced the number of jury trials, that would be of little
consequence for the already slight role that juries play in the criminal law.
There is one important exception: death penalty cases. In such cases, there
is usually a jury trial.179 In this subset of cases, an objector may contend that
community representation through juries is critical. In response, again I
maintain such community representation is only important insofar as it protects
the defendant. I contend that there is no particularly special interest in
vindicating the community’s desire to be directly involved in the determination
that the defendant be killed by the state. But even if one thinks there is value
in such (retributive) judgment, certainly no such interest would trump the
defendant’s interests in fair proceedings. Moreover, capital cases are
particularly susceptible to bias and deficiency of the forms that the option of a
bench trial may protect against.180
177. See supra Section I.A.
178. Covey, supra note 172, at 1238.
179. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (requiring juries to determine the aggravating
factors required for imposition of the death penalty).
180. In particular, these cases involve serious, grave harms, where there is the potential for strong
juror prejudice. See supra Section III.A.1.
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In sum, there are several potential sources for pervasive juror prejudice.
When the defendant does not have the option for a bench trial, the current state
of the law is ineffectual in addressing such pervasive prejudice. The primary
response is to use voir dire to sift out problematic jurors, but this cannot
properly cope with pervasive juror prejudice. The other solution—refusing to
hold the trial—fails due to its extreme nature; courts simply will not employ it.
Here, recognizing the defendant’s right to choose a bench trial can mitigate the
harms of pervasive juror prejudice. Principally, if judges writing reasoned
opinions are less susceptible to these forms of prejudice, then defendants can
better ensure that they are given a fair trial. Further, providing defendants with
this option does no harm to the defendant’s other rights, and it does not curtail
the principal purpose of the jury in protecting the defendant’s rights.
IV. THE HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL CASE
In the prior section, I contended that, because of the possibility of
pervasive juror prejudice, providing the defendant with the option of a bench
trial best preserves the defendant’s rights to a fair and impartial trial. In this
section, I show that the problem of pervasive prejudice is not simply of the
theoretical realm. Based on our historical and empirical evidence, pervasive
prejudice is manifest in many cases, and the right to bench trial can mitigate
those harms. Next, consider each of the four types of prejudice identified
above.181
A.

The Nature of Charges and Defenses

There is substantial evidence that pervasive bias may arise in the jury pool
against defendants due to the nature of the charges and defenses. The most
common pathway is that some cases involve such gruesome, terrible, or
disgusting allegations that jurors’ passions—principally, fear and animus—are
raised so that they are inclined to find the defendant guilty.182 Ultimately, jurors
know that it is not random chance that brought the defendant before the
tribunal.183 Jurors are aware that law enforcement had probable cause to believe
the defendant committed the crime and the prosecution believed it could prove
the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.184 In the face of terrible allegations,
jurors may be inclined to relax the presumption of innocence, the standard of
181. See supra Section I.D.
182. See Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials, 21 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 5, 6–10 (1997) [hereinafter Vidmar, Generic Prejudice] (discussing “specific prejudice”
against issues in particular cases and providing examples relating to the grievous nature of the crimes).
183. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (discussing the presumption of innocence
and stating that “jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there
by choice or happenstance”).
184. See id.
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proof, or other evidentiary standards in assessing the defendant’s guilt. This
could be because of ire or disgust; it could also be due to fear, where the jury
thinks it is better to punish (and incapacitate) this person, than to risk recurrent
harms of recidivism; and it could be unconscious and nonrational. For these
reasons, it is common in such cases to ask jurors in voir dire if the allegations
would affect their ability to be impartial. In most all cases, a sufficient number
of jurors state they are able. But there is good reason to doubt those professions
of impartiality.
As a prime example, we know that there is widespread hatred and fear of
those accused of child sexual assault offenses.185 As Neil Vidmar has shown, in
these child sexual assault cases, there is a “generic prejudice” that predominates
in the jury pool.186 The impact of the generic prejudice is such that many jurors
are unable to make impartial determinations about whether the alleged assault
even occurred and whether the defendant was responsible.187
Another area of similar hatred and fear is “terrorist” trials, involving
prosecutions after incidents of alleged terrorism. Two such examples are the
prosecution of Timothy McVeigh188 after the Oklahoma City Bombing and the
prosecution of John Walker Lindh189 (now known as Abu Sulayman alIrlandi),190 following the tragedies of September 11, in the U.S. military’s
operation in Afghanistan.
In McVeigh’s case, his defense counsel filed a motion to change venue,
which the district court granted.191 In so doing, the court emphasized the
devastating consequences of the bombing: 168 people died, the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Office Building was destroyed and there was grievous collateral
damage to the nearby area, the estimated incident cost was $651,594,000, and
there were “immeasurable effects on the hearts and minds of the people of
Oklahoma from the blast.”192 The district court also observed the nature of
media coverage, which comprehensively documented the losses felt by the
community and the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, “showing him in restraints and
185. See Vidmar, Generic Prejudice, supra note 182, at 6.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 18 (“[T]he issue was not mere disapprobation or abhorrence of sex abuse but rather
attitudes and beliefs that bear on the presumption of innocence when a defendant is accused of sexual
abuse. Simply upon hearing the nature of the charges against the defendant, substantial numbers of
jurors swore under oath that they could not be impartial in deciding guilt or innocence and were found
partial by the triers.”).
188. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
189. United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
190. Ruth Styles, John Walker Lindh Is Released from Prison Amid Outrage at Decision To Free
American Taliban After 17 Years, DAILY MAIL (May 23, 2019, 10:38 EDT),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7062311/John-Walker-Lindh-released-prison.html [https://
perma.cc/JN8Y-VRGC].
191. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. at 1469, 1475.
192. Id. at 1469.
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clad in bright orange jail clothing being led into a van while surrounded by a
very vocal and angry crowd.”193 In light of all this, the district court determined
that the potential for juror prejudice in Oklahoma was too large.194 The court
thus granted the motion to change venue and shifted the case to Denver,
Colorado.195 But one could indeed question whether a Denver jury would have
fared any better: the coverage of the Oklahoma City Bombing was a national
event. Denver jurors knew that 168 people died and that an American city was
destroyed, and they too saw Timothy McVeigh arrested.
Consider Lindh’s case. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States
commenced operations in Afghanistan.196 In combat, the U.S. military
apprehended Lindh, an American citizen who was fighting with the Taliban.197
Lindh allegedly participated in a prisoner uprising, during which he escaped.198
He was later apprehended again on the battlefield.199 He was then charged in
the Eastern District of Virginia with a panoply of crimes, including conspiracy
to murder and providing material support to terrorist organizations.200 His
counsel moved to dismiss the charges or change venue.201
In support of the motion, counsel proffered a survey done by Professor
Steven Penrod that showed the level of juror prejudice against Lindh.202 Prior
to trial, survey respondents in five different jurisdictions, including Virginia,
stated by over 70% that Lindh was definitely or probably guilty and by 37% or
higher that a not-guilty verdict would be unacceptable.203 Nevertheless, in all of
the jurisdictions, nearly 70% of respondents asserted that they could be
impartial.204 Professor Vidmar did an analysis of the interviews, concluding that
if the respondents professing impartiality were the jury pool, a random selection
would likely result in four of twelve jurors starting with a disposition inconsistent with
the presumption of innocence.205 Even still, the district court denied the motion to
dismiss or change venue.206 Shortly thereafter, Lindh would plead guilty to two
of the charges, and receive a sentence of twenty years.207
193. Id. at 1471.
194. Id. at 1474–75.
195. Id. at 1475.
196. See Neil Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims: Juror Prejudice and “Terrorist” Trials, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2003) [hereinafter Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims].
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1156.
201. Id. at 1157 n.78.
202. Id. at 1157.
203. Id. at 1161.
204. Id. at 1162.
205. Id. at 1169.
206. Id. at 1171.
207. Id.; Tom Jackman, In Deal, Lindh Pleads Guilty to Aiding Taliban, WASH. POST (July
16, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/07/16/in-deal-lindh-pleads-guilty-
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In the same vein, we see a significantly prejudicial impact on juries when
the allegations and evidence involve terrible and graphic violence. For example,
David Bright and Jane Goodman-Delahunty found that the conviction rate was
higher among mock juries that saw gruesome photographic evidence compared
to those that saw no such photographic evidence and that the juries who saw
the evidence “reported experiencing significantly more intense emotional
responses, including greater anger at the defendant.”208 Similarly, Kevin
Douglas, David Lyon, and James Ogloff found that mock jurors shown color
and black-and-white photographs of the murder victim were twice as likely to
convict the defendant.209 Finally, scholars have identified that there is a level of
animus, in the public and jury pool, against those defendants who raise insanity
defenses.210 That may be due to the public’s sense that these defendants are
attempting to circumvent liability through a legal technicality.211
B.

Reputation and Demeanor

A defendant’s reputation or demeanor may also be a potent source for
pervasive bias. A common example of this is if the jury knows of the defendant’s
prior crimes or acts. In Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s words, the commission
of a prior crime indicates to the jury a “general readiness to do evil” and the
jury may “infer a readiness to lie in the particular case.”212 Indeed, the empirical
research backs this up: “Jurors are more likely to convict an accused if they
receive information about previous convictions than if they do not.”213
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404 was designed precisely to combat this
type of bias, and there are substantially similar rules in state evidence codes as
well.214 Rule 404 attempts to exclude such evidence from the jury’s

to-aiding-taliban/d323d911-d0d5-4aaf-8db7-e49eedfc964b/ [https://perma.cc/HN55-CB2H (dark
archive)].
208. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame,
and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 183 (2006).
209. Kevin S. Douglas, David R. Lyon & James R.P. Ogloff, The Impact of Graphic Photographic
Evidence on Mock Jurors’ Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
485, 492 (1997).
210. See Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw,” supra note 2, at 208 (stating that “[i]nsanity pleaders
are among the most despised individuals in our society”).
211. See Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from Me”: The Insanity Defense, the
Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1380, 1403
(1997).
212. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
213. David R. Shaffer, The Defendant’s Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND
TRIAL PROCEDURE 124, 131 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Jeffrey Bellin,
The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 433 (2018) (collecting studies and performing a new
empirical study showing that prior convictions impact juror assessments of guilt).
214. FED. R. EVID. 404. Rule 404(b)(1)–(2), most relevant here, reads:
Rule 404(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
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consideration. The rule arises out of the recognition that juries are overwhelmed
by defendants’ prior crimes and acts and that the potential for juror prejudice
is great.
Unfortunately, Rule 404 can only do so much. First, as explained above,
Rule 404 has certain exceptions, like impeachment, wherein prior crimes and
acts may be admitted into evidence. Rule 404 directs that when such evidence
is admitted, it is to be limited to the relevant purpose.215 But the empirical
evidence reveals that juries often use the prior crimes and acts evidence to
adjudge the propensity of the defendant to commit the crime—a prohibited
use.216 Consequently, this may practically prevent the defendant from taking
critical actions to their defense, like testifying themselves.
Second, some defendants are infamous, and therefore their prior crimes
and acts cannot be shielded from the jury. Most famously, consider O.J.
Simpson, who was charged, tried, and convicted of robbery and kidnapping
stemming from events in 2007.217 At the time of his 2007 trial, virtually every
adult in the jury pool knew he had been tried, and acquitted, for the murders of
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman.218 And, in the age of social media

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove
a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
or lack of accident.
See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Evidence of prior convictions has been forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of
innocence of the crime currently charged. A jury might punish an accused for being guilty of a previous
offense, or feel that incarceration is justified because the accused is a ‘bad man,’ without regard to his
guilt of the crime currently charged. Of course it flouts human nature to suppose that a jury would not
consider a defendant’s previous trouble with the law in deciding whether he has committed the crime
currently charged against him.”); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)
(“Evidence of crimes not charged in the indictment is not admissible for the purpose of showing that
the defendant has a criminal disposition in order to generate the inference that he committed the crime
with which he is charged. A concomitant of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be
tried for what he did, not for who he is. The reason for this rule is that it is likely that the defendant
will be seriously prejudiced by the admission of evidence indicating that he has committed other
crimes.” (citations omitted)).
215. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
216. Bellin, supra note 213, at 425–27.
217. O.J. Simpson’s Lawyers Request Another Trial, CNN (Oct. 10, 2008),
https://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/10/simpson.newtrial/
[https://perma.cc/GQ26-PW9A]
(raising unsuccessfully the claim that some jurors’ disagreement with Simpson’s acquittal in the 1995
double homicide case may have tainted the jury’s verdict).
218. See Emily Shapiro, The OJ Simpson Trial: Where the Key Players Are 25 Years After His Acquittal,
ABC (Oct. 3, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/oj-simpson-case-key-players-25years/story?id=63180970 [https://perma.cc/J3GE-CZFW]. There was a Saturday Night Live sketch
lampooning the effort to find unbiased jurors in the 2007 trial. Saturday Night Live, O.J. Simpson Jurors
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and internet access, news is significantly more widespread. In the trial and
subsequent conviction of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman on drug and conspiracy
charges, defense counsel charged that at least five jurors had “followed news
reports and Twitter feeds about the case, against a judge’s orders, and were
aware of potentially prejudicial material that jurors weren’t supposed to see.”219
Because of the grave potential of prejudice, these defendants cannot be assured
a fair and impartial jury trial.
The example of demeanor is similar.220 Studies have shown that jurors are
strongly influenced by a defendant’s attractiveness.221 Jurors may also be
impacted by similar things like clothing choices, fidgeting and hand movements,
smiling (or lack thereof), and eye contact (or lack thereof), among other
things.222 Some of these can be managed, but some cannot. For example, a
defendant’s attractiveness is not something they can change. And their fidgeting
and hand movements may be a product of nervousness or anxiety that cannot
be controlled. Additionally, the defendant’s proclivity for smiling and making
eye contact may be a product of shyness, nervousness, or anxiety and thus not
within their control. At minimum, a defendant should not have to change any
of these features of their persona or behavior to receive a fair determination
from the jury. None of these have any demonstrated probative relationship with
the defendant’s guilt; demeanor is not evidence and courts rarely instruct juries
on how to consider it.223 Yet juries are impacted by it, and this may severely
(and predictably) disadvantage certain defendants.
C.

Identity and Bigotry

Our history and experience are rife with pervasive juror bias due to
immutable traits of personal identity. The history of the jury during the Jim
Crow era as an institution thoroughly impacted by racial prejudice has been well
documented.224 Even after civil rights reforms to our society and the jury, there
is convincing evidence that juries continue to be impacted by bias with respect
to race and ethnicity. As discussed above, the Supreme Court confronted the
issue head on in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, which involved a juror making
Are Hard To Come By, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSahneOul10
[https://perma.cc/99QW-AZ3N].
219. Jim Mustian & Michael R. Sisak, El Chapo’s Lawyers Raise Concerns Over Allegations of Jury
Misconduct, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ctel-chapo-trial-jury-misconduct-report-20190220-story.html [https://perma.cc/7E6G-6YGJ (staffuploaded, dark archive)].
220. Levenson, supra note 3, at 577–78.
221. See id. at 576 (describing how juries are more likely to vote guilty for unattractive defendants
and not guilty for attractive ones).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 579 (“[J]urors are not given any direction on how to consider a defendant’s demeanor.”).
224. See infra Section V.B.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1621 (2022)

1666

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

bigoted statements against the defendant during jury deliberations.225 But the
Court’s response of allowing inquiry into jury deliberations only when there
were overt bigoted remarks by jurors falls woefully short of recognizing the
depth of the problem.226
The empirical evidence is deafening: bias pervades juries in their
deliberations. For example, Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth have
shown that, in certain settings, white jurors exhibit bias against Black
defendants and that this affects determinations of guilt and sentencing
recommendations.227 Sommers and Ellsworth found this was especially evident
with respect to violent crimes.228 In a mock jury study, Dolores Perez, Harmon
Hosch, Bruce Ponder, and Gloria Chanez Trejo found that white-majority
juries were more lenient on white defendants than Hispanic defendants.229 And
Justin Levinson’s work through empirical surveys has similarly shown that the
race and skin tone of the perpetrator impacts jurors through implicit bias.230 In
particular, Levinson demonstrates that respondents implicitly associated black
with guilty and white with not guilty231 and “misremember case facts in racially
biased ways,” including misremembering facts to find them aggressive when the
defendant is Black.232 Reviewing a decade of research, Jennifer Hunt stated that
225. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861–62 (2017).
226. Id. at 869.
227. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and
Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1006 (2003)
(summarizing results of various surveys and experiments). Interestingly, Sommers and Ellsworth
found that racial bias by white jurors is more likely to occur when the trial is not racially charged, but
rather when the salient racial norms are absent from the discourse of the trial. As they state, “White
juror bias may be most likely when a trial is not racially charged and jurors’ concerns about racism are
not made salient. In other words, it is the non-race-salient, run-of-the-mill trial in which the defendant
simply happens to be Black that might be most likely to elicit White juror bias.” Id. at 1014. Given that
racial norms are often not explicitly part of the trial discourse, this may mean that racial bias is actually
more prevalent than not.
228. Id. at 1007–08.
229. Dolores A. Perez, Harmon M. Hosch, Bruce Ponder & Gloria Chanez Trejo, Ethnicity of
Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1249, 1256 (1993). The
study also found that Hispanic majority juries treated white and Hispanic defendants equally. Id.
230. Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189–90 (2010) [hereinafter
Levinson, The Test]; Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 350–51 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Equality]; see also Justin D.
Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of
Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 310–11 (2010) [hereinafter Levinson et al., Shades]
(identifying racial bias in jurors’ evaluation of evidence).
231. Levinson, The Test, supra note 230, at 190 (finding that empirical study respondents implicitly
associated black with guilty and white with not guilty).
232. Levinson, Equality, supra note 230, at 345; see also Levinson et al., Shades, supra note 230, at
310–11 (finding in empirical study that participants’ judgments of evidence varied upon whether they
had seen a photograph of a darker- or lighter-skinned perpetrator). There have been substantial
questions about the science and strength of the conclusions on implicit bias. I do not take the literature
on implicit bias to be irrefutable, but I think that the implicit bias literature, combined with the other
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“the race and ethnicity of defendants, victims, and jurors can impact the
outcomes of criminal trials.”233
Though not as well studied, similar attitudes based on a defendant’s
religion or religious beliefs can negatively impact defendants.234 This is
especially true of religious backgrounds that are considered abnormal or deviant
by the majority or are portrayed negatively in media and popular culture. In the
context of prosecutions of terrorism, Vidmar observes:
When accused persons are ethnically of Arab descent and adhere to the
Muslim, religion generic prejudices about the links between these factors
and terrorism are likely to be foremost in prospective jurors’ minds, even
among those who do not harbor general hostility toward Arabs or
Muslims. It is very plausible to hypothesize that these beliefs are present
in all communities since all Americans are potential victims, though, as
noted before, they may vary in degree between communities.235
One case that brought this issue of potential religious bias by the jury into
the spotlight was United States v. Sun Myung Moon.236 In that case, the Reverend
Sun Myung Moon and Takeru Kamiyama were charged with crimes related to
alleged tax evasion.237 Moon was famously the head of the Unification Church,
his religion loosely based on Christianity in which he claimed to be and was
revered as the messiah.238 Moon grieved that his prosecution was religiously
motivated.239 At the commencement of proceedings, Moon attempted to waive
his right to a jury and sought a bench trial, contending that hostility towards his
religion and him would deprive him of a fair trial.240 The government opposed
the bench trial, contending that because Moon had made a public statement
questioning the prosecutorial motives, placing the factfinding burden on one

empirical evidence, bolsters the claim that pervasive juror prejudice relating to the defendant’s
immutable features arises frequently and can be difficult to discover through voir dire and jury
selection.
233. Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 269, 273 (2015); see also Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer
Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1142 (2012) (“Notwithstanding some
mixed findings, the general research consensus is that jurors of one race tend to show bias against
defendants who belong to another race (‘racial outgroups’).”).
234. Marc W. Pearce & Samantha L. Schwartz, Can Jurors’ Religious Biases Affect Verdicts in Criminal
Trials?, 41 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 26, 26 (2012) (contending that implicit bias against Muslims can be
difficult to detect and could impact juror attitudes, and calling for further study on the subject).
235. Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims, supra note 196, at 1172.
236. 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983).
237. Id. at 1216.
238. Alfred J. Sciarrino, United States v. Sun Myung Moon: Precedent for Tax Fraud Prosecution of
Local Pastors?, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 237, 242.
239. Id. at 246.
240. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1217, 1219.
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judge, instead of a full jury, would put the judge in an “untenable” position.241
The district court denied Moon’s request for bench trial, Moon was convicted,
and the Second Circuit affirmed.242 It is hard to say whether the jury was in fact
impacted by Moon’s religion. But the public generally unfavorably regarded
Moon and the Unification Church as a cult.243 The prosecution may have
benefited from a biased jury, but the prosecution had a ready explanation for
why it opposed bench trial based on Moon’s accusation of juror bias.
D.

Juror Incompetency

Finally, there are areas of juror incompetency that remain widespread in
the jury pool. Some cases are inherently complex. For example, cases involving
financial transactions and healthcare fraud can often test the ability of the jury
to comprehend volumes of evidence on unfamiliar subject matter. Indeed, one
such case was United States v. Panteleakis.244 The defendants in the case were
charged with twenty-one counts of Medicare fraud.245 They sought a bench trial,
and the government objected.246 However, the district court granted the bench
trial over the government’s objection, observing that the case involved complex
issues, difficult evidentiary questions that would be resolved differently for each
defendant, and potentially prejudicial news coverage.247 Thus, the district court
circumvented the requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) of
government consent to proceed via bench trial. And though this result is
uncommon, this kind of case is not rare. There are numerous federal
prosecutions on such complex subject matter, involving multiple defendants
and potentially conflicting evidentiary rulings, or prejudicial news coverage that
is easily accessible by the jury.
There are also other kinds of evidentiary rules that even the most wellintentioned jurors may be unable to apply faithfully. As discussed, juries are
greatly swayed by prior crimes and acts evidence to a prejudicial level—
necessitating exclusionary rules like Rule 404.248 But the evidentiary rules are
not without important exceptions: prior crimes and acts evidence may be
allowed to impeach a testifying defendant—but only for the purposes of

241. Id. at 1217.
242. Id. at 1217–18.
243. See Rachael Bletchly, Dark Side of the Moon: How Megalomaniac Moonie Leader Built a BillionDollar Business Empire Through Sinister Cult, MIRROR (Sept. 4, 2012, 4:23
AM), https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/inside-the-sinister-moonie-cult-how-1301689 [http
s:// perma.cc/Q4J9-5SUJ].
244. 422 F. Supp. 247 (D.R.I. 1976).
245. Id. at 248.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 249–50.
248. FED. R. EVID. 404.
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impeachment.249 Such evidence may be allowed to show “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.”250 But again such evidence is only allowed for these purposes—not to
show that the defendant acted similarly as they did before.251 This distinction is
a fine one, and jurors simply may not be able to consider the evidence for the
isolated purposes that are allowed.252
This can lead to substantial impingements of a defendant’s case. First,
jurors may be so prejudiced by the evidence itself that they are unable to follow
the court’s instructions. But also, the defendant may be forced to craft their case
in a way to avoid such prejudice, such as by not testifying or not proffering
other evidence that would “open the door” to the prejudice.253 These
circumstances are all too common.
E.

The Need for the Right to Bench Trial

Thus, the empirical and historical evidence show that pervasive juror
prejudice is an actual problem in our criminal justice system. Each form of juror
prejudice—juror bias due to the nature of the charges, bias due to the
defendant’s reputation or demeanor, bias due to immutable features of the
defendant, and juror deficiency in the ability to comprehend and apply the
law—manifest with relative frequency.
Moreover, when such pervasive juror prejudice does manifest, the
empirical evidence reveals that jurors often regard themselves as fair and
impartial decision makers.254 Consequently, when there is pervasive juror
prejudice, our main pathways to mitigating such prejudice are blocked. Courts
are likely to rely on voir dire to sift out jurors who are afflicted with such
prejudice, whether it be some form of bias or deficiency. Yet the evidence shows
that this is unlikely to be an effective method of mitigating prejudice precisely
249. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
250. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1)–(2).
251. Id.
252. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. at 249.
253. See Kurland, supra note 17, at 336 (arguing that providing a unilateral right to bench trial may
better vindicate a defendant’s ability to testify, by avoiding potential prejudice from impeaching
evidence). Kurland discusses the case United States v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), dealing
with income tax evasion charges. Id. at 461. The government had initially consented to a bench trial,
and the defendant was duly convicted. Id. at 461–62. That conviction was later overturned as a result
of the Solicitor General’s representation that some of the evidence may have been unlawfully obtained.
Id. In the second trial, the government sought to withdraw its consent to a bench trial. Id. The late
great Judge Jack Weinstein refused to allow the government to withdraw its consent and granted the
motion for bench trial, id. at 464, because “the nature of charges made it impossible for the jury not to
be made aware of the defendant’s prior criminal record,” Kurland, supra note 17, at 339 n.97. But again,
it is unclear whether most judges would apply Rule 23(a) in this fashion—hence the need for the
defendant’s optionality.
254. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
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because jurors, even answering voir dire questions honestly, do not recognize
their own biases or deficiencies.255
This results in constitutional harms that demand remedy. I contend that
remedy, at least partially, is to provide the defendant with the unilateral right
to bench trial. One might inquire, however, whether it is empirically necessary
to vest a unilateral right with the defendant. Do prosecutors and courts actually
reject a defendant’s request for bench trial in cases with the potential for juror
prejudice? There is not much available empirical evidence on this question, and
it would be hard to obtain. For one, prosecutors and courts are unlikely to admit
this. Moreover, most cases do not proceed to trial, making this further difficult
to study.
Prosecutors do sometimes oppose defendants’ requests for bench trial;
such opposition comes precisely in the kinds of cases where the identified
varieties of pervasive juror prejudice are likely to arise.256 Those include cases
involving unsympathetic defendants like those accused of tax evasion, fraud,
and driving under the influence; cases involving allegations of grievous, violent
conduct, or prurient conduct; and cases involving claimed discrimination of a
distinct minority. We also know that jury trial is mandated in most death
penalty cases, which are very likely to be emotionally charged. Overall, these
cases are the ones in which the prosecution’s opposition to bench trial is most
dangerous to the defendant’s constitutional rights.
Of course, not every defendant’s case will be infected by pervasive juror
prejudice. For example, defendants charged with relatively nonserious crimes,
defendants who have no worrying reputation or prior history, and defendants
255. See supra Sections IV.C, IV.D.
256. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 25–26 (1965) (involving complex claims of
fraud against songwriters); United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (2d Cir. 1983)
(involving claim of religious discrimination by prosecutors in tax fraud case); United States. v. Cohn,
481 F. Supp. 3d 122, 123–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (granting bench trial over prosecutor’s objection due to
complexity of issues and complications with selecting jury due to COVID-19 pandemic, in case
involving obstruction of justice by former SEC official); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 91–92
(2d Cir. 1997) (upholding government’s decision to oppose defendants’ motion for bench trial, in case
against executives of jet engine repair company charged with fraud related to representations about
repairs made), overruled in part on other grounds, United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 176 (2d Cir.
2006); People v. King, 463 P.2d 753, 754 (Cal. 1970) (upholding government’s opposition to bench
trial in grievous murder case); People v. Washington, 458 P.2d 479, 485–500 (Cal. 1969) (upholding
government’s opposition to bench trial in grievous murder case involving prurient conduct); State v.
Austin, 360 P.3d 603, 607–10 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (overturning conviction of DUI case, where
defendant requested bench trial, prosecution preferred jury trial, and court proceeded with jury trial);
State v. Childs, 53,833, pp. 2–6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/21); 317 So. 3d 917, 918–20 (involving a
prosecutor’s opposition to defendant’s request for bench trial in case involving armed robbery and
attempted murder, where defendant allegedly terrorized children); see also Jody Godoy, Ex-SEC
Examiner Wants Bench Trial Over Feds’ Protest, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2020, 2:43 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1299883/ex-sec-examiner-wants-bench-trial-over-feds-protest [http
s://perma.cc/3PEP-SGKT (staff-uploaded, dark archive)] (“A source with knowledge of the office’s
policies told Law360 that prosecutors in the district generally oppose bench trials in criminal cases.”).
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who belong to the preferred majority groups may have little to worry about in
terms of detrimental juror prejudice.257 But there are a great number of
defendants who belong to the precarious complements. These defendants face
the specter of a jury of some peers—not necessarily theirs—who are already
inclined to find them guilty or are unable to assess their guilt. Our justice
system is adjudged not on how it handles easy cases, but rather how it ascertains
the truth while safeguarding the rights of the damned and despised.
Consequently, we should place the decision between jury trial and bench trial
solely in the hands of the defendant, ensuring that determination is made in the
interest of protecting the defendant’s rights.
V. THE DOCTRINAL CASE
This Article first explored the theoretical case for recognizing the right to
bench trial. In the face of pervasive juror prejudice, providing the defendant
with the optionality of bench trial can best mitigate any juror bias or deficiency,
while safeguarding the defendant’s other rights. This is not simply a theoretical
exercise. The empirical and historical evidence demonstrate that pervasive juror
prejudice occurs with relative frequency and, when it does occur, voir dire is
unlikely to be effective in mitigating the harms. Moreover, prosecutors may
oppose bench trial in the most precarious cases; and, jury trials are usually
mandated in death penalty cases. Thus, providing the defendant with the choice
of bench trial is, as a practical matter, requisite to mitigating pervasive juror
prejudice.
Finally, then, is the doctrinal case. I contend that the Sixth Amendment,
as expounded upon by the Court’s precedent, strongly supports recognizing the
defendant’s right to bench trial.
A.

Waiver of Sixth Amendment Rights

The Sixth Amendment is a cornucopia of protections for defendants. The
Amendment enumerates the following rights: (1) speedy trial; (2) public trial;
(3) trial by an impartial jury; (4) trial in a particular district of the crime’s
commission; (5) to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; (6)
to confront adverse witnesses; (7) to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses; and (8) to have assistance of counsel.258

257. We do not have particularized evidence that jurors are prejudiced against such defendants.
But if they are, that makes the argument for the right to opt for bench trial all the stronger.
258. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
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First, consider the defendant’s right to counsel. The Supreme Court has
held that, with certain qualifications, a defendant has a unilateral right to waive
the right to counsel. In Faretta v. California,259 the defendant, charged with
grand theft, timely requested to represent himself.260 The court questioned his
intention, to which the defendant responded that he had previously represented
himself “in a criminal prosecution, that he had a high school education, and that
he did not want to be represented by the public defender because he believed
that that office was ‘very loaded down with . . . a heavy case load.’”261 The court
stated that the defendant was making a mistake, but tentatively granted him the
right to proceed without counsel.262 Thereafter, the court inquired into the state
of the defendant’s representation and tested his knowledge of substantive
doctrine.263 Based on his answers, the court determined that the defendant’s
waiver was not knowing and intelligent and overturned its decision to allow the
defendant to proceed without counsel.264 The defendant sought to act as cocounsel and sought to make motions himself.265 Those requests were rejected
and the court “required that [the] defense be conducted only through the
appointed lawyer from the public defender’s office.”266 The defendant was
convicted and sentenced.267 His appeals to the California Court of Appeal and
California Supreme Court were unsuccessful and the case found its way to the
U.S. Supreme Court.268
The Court reversed, holding that a defendant has the unilateral right to
waive the assistance of counsel.269 The Court reasoned that the “language and
spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense
tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant—
not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his
right to defend himself personally,” and that forcing counsel upon the defendant
“violates the logic of the Amendment.”270 The Court also looked to history,
explaining that “[i]n the American Colonies the insistence upon a right of selfrepresentation was, if anything, . . . fervent,” due to the “appreciation of the
virtues of self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers.”271 Thus, though the
benefits of representation by counsel were recognized, the right to self259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Id. at 807.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id. at 809–10.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 811.
Id.
Id. at 811–12.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 826.
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representation was never doubted.272 Indeed, the Court stated that, though
representation by counsel is most likely better for the defendant, in some cases
the defendant may be better off representing themselves.273 That is a personal
choice for the defendant and the defendant will bear the consequences of that
choice.274
The Court did condition the right to waive counsel: “[I]n order to
represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those
relinquished benefits”; that is not a question of the defendant’s skill but rather
their awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.275
Subsequently, in Indiana v. Edwards,276 the Court further elucidated that where
a defendant is competent to stand trial, but not competent to conduct trial
proceedings by themselves—for example, due to the defendant’s mental
illness—the government may insist that the defendant be represented by
counsel.277
The Supreme Court’s teaching in Faretta makes plain that a defendant
should have an analogous unilateral right to waive jury trial in favor of bench
trial. Just as with the right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury is principally a right to protect the defendant. And just as with
representation by counsel, if a jury does not protect the defendant, then the
government should not be able to impose a jury trial upon the defendant instead
of a bench trial. That too violates the logic of the Amendment: the purpose is
to provide the defendant with an impartial factfinder, but if a jury is unable to
do that, then we should not impose that upon the defendant. As explained
above, the defendant is the best situated to determine whether the jury is
impartial. Though a jury trial may be better for the defendant in most cases, in
some it will not. Consequently, that choice should be left to the defendant—
who must bear the consequences of that choice.
In addition to the defendant’s unilateral right to waive counsel, the
defendant also has the unilateral right to have a compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses.278 The defendant can simply not avail themselves of this
right—and opt not to serve process on any witnesses. This too fits analogously
with the defendant’s right to waive a jury trial and opt for a bench trial.
Now, many of these Sixth Amendment rights cannot be unilaterally
waived by the defendant. The defendant cannot unilaterally waive their right

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 852.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 835, 845.
Id. at 835 (citation omitted).
554 U.S. 164 (2008).
Id. at 174.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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to speedy trial and insist that the trial be continually delayed.279 The defendant
does not get to unilaterally waive that the trial be held in the district of the
crime’s commission, instead demanding another venue.280 The defendant also
seemingly cannot unilaterally waive the requirement that they be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation—the defendant may be required to
appear when summoned by the court and then they will be informed of the
charges.281
There is an important distinction that makes the disanalogy plain: each of
these rights cannot be unilaterally waived because their satisfaction is critical to
there being a proceeding.282 The defendant does not have the right to opt that
there be no criminal proceeding against them. This is unlike the right to counsel
and the right to a compulsory process; there can be an adversarial proceeding
against the defendant, even if the defendant does not avail themselves of those
rights.
Putting all of this together, I contend that Sixth Amendment waiver of
rights is explained by the following principle: the defendant has the right to
waive their Sixth Amendment rights that are in service of protecting the
defendant and do not halt or hinder an adversarial proceeding against the
defendant. Indeed, this distinction—whether the right is critical to the
occurrence of a proceeding—makes sense of the Court’s conspicuous holding in
Edwards. There, the incapacity of the defendant to conduct trial proceedings
themselves would have halted the ability to conduct adversarial proceedings
against the defendant—and thus, it could not be waived.283 In contrast, the right
to jury trial can be waived without jeopardizing the existence of an adversarial
proceeding, for the case will proceed as a bench trial. Thus, as a matter of
constitutional doctrine, the defendant should have the choice.
B.

Bigotry in Jury Selection and Decision-Making

Our history with the institution of the jury also shows its grave
deficiencies and why there should be a constitutional right to bench trial. It is
279. See Garcia, supra note 122, at 34 (arguing that the right to speedy trial has a second-class status
and is difficult to assert effectively); see also Amsterdam, supra note 122, at 525 (“In a quite literal sense,
the sixth amendment right to speedy trial has today become . . . more honored in the breach than the
observance.”).
280. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 379–85 (2010).
281. Consider the federal bail statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), which considers whether a defendant
will appear as required.
282. The right to a particular venue—the district where the crime was committed—is not generally
unilaterally waivable by the defendant. And one could argue that this does not fit the rule, given that
changing venue would not obviously halt the proceeding. In response, changing the venue may
drastically increase the cost of the proceeding (and practically halt the proceeding) or substantially
delay it, since witnesses and parties would have to travel to the new venue. Neither is the case with
bench trial.
283. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008).
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well documented how the institution of the jury was crafted as a tool of Jim
Crow, leading to discrimination against Black people and other minorities in
the criminal justice system.284 As Dorothy Roberts explains, “With the
reinstatement of the white supremacist regime in the South, all-white juries
became an instrument of white terror. Maintaining the slavery-era rule that
only white people were entitled to serve on juries was a way for the Jim Crow
state to reenslave newly freed blacks [through imprisonment].”285 That
continues to permeate features of the modern jury.286
One primary place where we see manipulation of the jury in racist or
otherwise bigoted ways is in selection of the jury itself. Historically, Black
people were excluded from juries explicitly based on their race.287 When such
explicit discrimination became illegal and an unavailable method, jurisdictions
used other purportedly facially race-neutral means to accomplish the same goal.
For example, jurisdictions used “key-man” systems (as opposed to randomized
selection), where an individual was appointed to select jurors for the venire,
from which the petit jury would be chosen.288 These systems could and did
result in racial discrimination in juries, primarily excluding Black people.289
In addition, regardless of the system used to select the venire, even if the
venire is populated with minority individuals, prosecutors can use peremptory
challenges to eliminate them from the jury. We know this continues to occur
with shameful regularity.290 In Flowers v. Mississippi,291 the Court recognized this

284. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 168–92 (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 95–102 (2019); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights
Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 110 (1993)
(noting the “history of racism in this country and the history of the use of the jury to enforce that
racism”).
285. Roberts, supra note 284, at 101. On this point, see also the following sources cited in Professor
Roberts’s opus: William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and
White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
171, 259 (2001); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 110–15 (1990); James Forman,
Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 909–10 (2004); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1616–49 (1985).
286. Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1620 (2018) (“The Jim
Crow jury never fully fell. While the methods of racial exclusion have changed over the years—
peremptory challenges, for example, ‘did not become a primary tool for excluding black jurors until
1935’—equitable representation on criminal juries has not existed since the height of Reconstruction
(and only then in limited areas). Put differently, across American jury boxes today there are thousands
of missing nonwhite jurors. Instead, these seats are filled by white jurors that, absent systemic racial
exclusion, a nonwhite juror would be occupying. In kind, if not degree, it has always been so since
Congress outlawed racial discrimination in jury selection 143 years ago.”).
287. KENNEDY, supra note 284, at 169–75.
288. Id. at 182–86.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 193–230.
291. 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
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truth, writing “the freedom to exercise peremptory strikes for any reason meant
that ‘the problem of racial exclusion from jury service’ remained ‘widespread’
and ‘deeply entrenched.’”292 The Court further explained the “cold reality of
jury selection . . . both history and math tell us that a system of race-based
peremptories does not treat black defendants and black prospective jurors
equally with prosecutors and white prospective jurors.”293 As discussed in
Flowers, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky294 set forth a procedure by
which parties could challenge the adverse party’s peremptory strikes as on the
basis of protected grounds.295 But, as many have explained, the Court’s efforts
to curtail the racist use of peremptory challenges has largely failed, because
attorneys can articulate pretextual, non-race-based explanations for their racist
use of peremptory challenges.296 For example, in a 2010 report on racial
discrimination in jury selection, the Equal Justice Initiative found that “a
startlingly common reason given by prosecutors for striking black prospective
jurors is a juror’s alleged ‘low intelligence’ or ‘lack of education.’”297
Furthermore, as observed by Luz E. Herrera & Pilar Margarita Hernández
Escontrías, “Spanish-language fluency has often been cited as a legitimate
reason to exclude Latinxs from serving on juries,” even when jurors are
competent to assess the case in English.298 To this end, Herrera and Hernández
Escontrías highlight the case Hernandez v. New York,299 where the Supreme
Court acknowledged the “harsh paradox that one may become proficient enough
in English to participate in trial . . . only to encounter disqualification because
he knows a second language as well.”300 But the Court nevertheless affirmed the
conviction and blessed the peremptory strike because of its purported raceneutral basis.301
But the racist and bigoted aspects of the jury were not limited to juror
selection—they infected the juror decision-making process as well. Consider
292. Id. at 2239 (citation omitted).
293. Id. at 2242.
294. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
295. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241–44.
296. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 284, at 208–14 (discussing the issue of enforcing the
prohibition on racially discriminatory peremptory challenges); Harry I. Subin & Michael C. Meltsner,
Confronting Unequal Protection of the Law, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 163, 166 (1998);
Morrison, supra note 167, at 38 (setting forth empirical evidence of the failure of Batson to curb abuse
of peremptory strikes).
297. Luz E. Herrera & Pilar Margarita Hernández Escontrías, The Network for Justice: Pursuing a
Latinx Civil Rights Agenda, 21 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 165, 206 (2018) (quoting EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 17
(2010), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/8667-284F]).
298. Id.
299. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
300. Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
301. Id. at 372.
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the recent Supreme Court case Ramos v. Louisiana.302 Ramos concerned whether
it is a constitutional requirement that criminal jury verdicts be unanimous.303
There, the defendant was charged with a serious crime and opted to be tried by
jury, and the jury convicted by a verdict of ten to two.304 Whereas in forty-eight
states, all but Louisiana and Oregon, such a nonunanimous verdict would have
resulted in further deliberations and, if not resolved into a unanimous verdict,
in a mistrial, and in Louisiana that margin was sufficient to convict.305 The
defendant was sentenced to life without parole and appealed the conviction on
the basis that the nonunanimous verdict violated his Sixth Amendment
rights.306
The Court agreed and reversed the conviction.307 In so doing, the Court
traced the history of the Louisiana and Oregon rules allowing for nonunanimous
verdicts.308 The Court’s recognition of the sordid, bigoted history of these rules
is stunning:
Louisiana first endorsed nonunanimous verdicts for serious crimes at a
constitutional convention in 1898. According to one committee
chairman, the avowed purpose of that convention was to “establish the
supremacy of the white race,” and the resulting document included many
of the trappings of the Jim Crow era: a poll tax, a combined literacy and
property ownership test, and a grandfather clause that in practice
exempted white residents from the most onerous of these requirements.
Nor was it only the prospect of African Americans voting that concerned
the delegates. Just a week before the convention, the U.S. Senate passed
a resolution calling for an investigation into whether Louisiana was
systemically excluding African Americans from juries. Seeking to avoid
unwanted national attention, and aware that this Court would strike
down any policy of overt discrimination against African American jurors
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the delegates sought to
undermine African American participation on juries in another way.
With a careful eye on racial demographics, the convention delegates
sculpted a “facially race-neutral” rule permitting 10-to-2 verdicts in order
“to ensure that African-American juror service would be meaningless.”
Adopted in the 1930s, Oregon’s rule permitting nonunanimous verdicts
can be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to
dilute “the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
Id. at 1393–94.
Id. at 1394.
Id.
Id. at 1394–95.
Id. at 1397, 1408.
Id. at 1394–95.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1621 (2022)

1678

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

juries.” In fact, no one before us contests any of this; courts in both
Louisiana and Oregon have frankly acknowledged that race was a
motivating factor in the adoption of their States’ respective
nonunanimity rules.309
On the backdrop of this history, the Court observed that “[t]he text and
structure of the Constitution clearly suggest that the term ‘trial by an impartial
jury’ carried with it some meaning about the content and requirements of a jury
trial.”310 The Court then elucidated how unanimity was historically regarded as
critical to ensuring impartiality of the jury.311 Thus, applying this historical
understanding, the Court held that such impartiality required unanimity of the
jury in casting its verdict.312
Finally, revisit the now familiar Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado. There the
Court held that
where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on
racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth
Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to
permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement
and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.313
In each of these three contexts, the Court recognized the potential for
racism and bigotry to taint the jury’s verdict and determined that a
constitutional remedy is required. Specifically, with respect to bigoted use of
peremptory challenges, the Court set forth the Batson procedure. With respect
to non-unanimity rules used to cabin the impact of minority jurors selected, the
Court struck them down and instead required unanimous jury verdicts. With
respect to alleged bigotry in juror deliberations, the Court created an exception
to non-juror-impeachment rules that allowed for examining those deliberations.
Similarly, there is just as manifest a problem of pervasive juror prejudice in,
among other ways, racism and bigotry, that threatens defendants’ constitutional
rights. Just as the Court has prudently recognized in these other contexts, there
needs to be a practically viable solution to remedy the potential constitutional
perils that may befall the defendant. That best remedy, given the practical
realities, is recognizing the defendant’s unilateral right to opt for bench trial.
C.

Objections

There are two persisting doctrinal objections. First, the argument on
waiver pays insufficient attention to the constitutional importance of a jury
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 1394 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1395.
Id. at 1395–97.
Id. at 1397.
Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
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trial. Second, one might grieve that even if a constitutional response to
pervasive prejudice is required, the remedy of unilateral optionality is not and
there are other alternative solutions. I consider each of these complaints in turn.
Waiver. Here the objector’s complaint is that a jury trial is of constitutional
importance such that it should not be subject to the defendant’s waiver. But this
is belied by our constitutional jurisprudence and our practice. The Court made
clear in Patton v. United States314 that a jury trial can be waived under the right
circumstances.315 Moreover, our practice exhibits no special fealty to jury trial—
the vast majority of criminal cases do not go to trial and are instead either
dismissed or resolved by plea.316 Indeed, the Court in Santobello v. New York317
recognized the importance of plea bargaining:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called “plea bargaining,”
is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly
administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government
would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court
facilities.318
And in every jurisdiction, there are plenty of bench trials as well. The only
question for us is under what conditions waiver should be allowed. I have argued
that as a doctrinal matter, it should be treated like the rights to counsel and
compulsory process, subject to unilateral waiver—because none of these rights
are prima facie necessary for there to be a proceeding against the defendant.
Alternative Solutions. Here, the objector’s grievance is that the doctrine
does not require the particular solution of offering the defendant the unilateral
option to choose; perhaps an examination of the prosecutor’s good faith reasons
for withholding consent or judicial determination of appropriateness of the
bench trial could suffice. However, the constitutional harm of pervasive juror
prejudice demands an efficacious remedy—one that can actually ensure
defendants have impartial, competent factfinders determining their cases.
These two alternatives cannot ensure that.
An examination of a prosecutor’s reasons would be a meaningless exercise.
Under such a regime, a prosecutor could always simply state, perhaps
pretextually, that the government has an interest in public involvement in the
determination of guilt or innocence through jury trial. No further reasons would
be necessary, and that incantation would be enough to block the defendant’s
314. 281 U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
315. Id. at 298.
316. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 172, at 1238 (reporting that more than 95% of all state and federal
felony convictions are obtained by guilty pleas).
317. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
318. Id. at 260.
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exercise, even if there was a genuine problem with pervasive juror prejudice.
Some prosecutors may appropriately acknowledge juror prejudice and consent
to waiver, but a defendant’s right to impartial adjudication cannot depend on
the adverse prosecutor’s good faith. And even if an examination of a
prosecutor’s motives is somehow more searching, that too will likely be
ineffectual—as it has become in the Batson context.319
Requiring judicial determination is similarly inefficacious. There are many
reasons, including that the court may be subject to various pressures. But
consider an operational reason: suppose a judge makes the determination that
juror prejudice should allow for a bench trial. Upon making such a
determination, suppose the defendant revokes the request for a bench trial and
instead insists on an impartial jury trial. Because of the court’s determination
of juror prejudice, the defendant would seemingly be entitled to delay of the
trial (and perhaps eventual dismissal). Of course, in theory, this is no trouble—
if there is pervasive juror prejudice, then the trial should be delayed or
dismissed. But, as noted,320 the extreme nature of this remedy renders it
disfavored and unlikely. And because this result is a downstream consequence
of the judicial determination allowing for a bench trial, then it stands to reason
that courts will similarly be chary in determining that a bench trial is allowed.
To block this maneuver, courts could fashion a mechanism where if the
defendant initiates a demand for a bench trial, then the defendant cannot revoke
it and opt for jury trial. But this smacks of disingenuousness and should be
disfavored. While the court can condition the request for jury trial for purposes
of administration (for example with time limits and notices), that is not the
purpose of this rule. The purpose of such a rule is simply to insulate the court
from making an unpopular, but legally warranted, decision that the defendant’s
jury trial right is unsatisfiable.
The Court need not punt to the legislatures or lower courts to fashion a
misshapen tool of a remedy. The Court is empowered to fashion an appropriate
solution to meet the constitutional need. The Court did so in Miranda v.
Arizona,321 where it told law enforcement precisely the warnings that needed to
be communicated to those subjected to custodial interrogation.322 Here, the
simplest answer is the correct one, and the Court should embrace it. Placing the
319. See Morrison, supra note 167, at 34 (“[T]he chances of a judge being able to divine an
attorney’s true intent in exercising a strike are remote.”).
320. See supra Section III.B.2.
321. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
322. Id. at 467–79. The Court invited legislatures to craft other means to accomplish the same goal
but set forth this solution as a default to be displaced by other action that would remedy the
constitutional harm. Id. at 478–79. It can do the same here. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants As Private Attorneys
General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 286 (1988) (discussing the obligation of the judiciary to fashion
deterrent remedies in criminal law).
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choice of factfinder in the defendant’s hands is the most efficacious remedy to
ensure that the defendant can circumvent the perils of pervasive juror prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Among the gravest perils a defendant faces in the criminal process is that
those who are rendering the verdict will have already adjudged the defendant
guilty or at least favor doing so. That is anathema to justice. Recognizing this,
the Constitution enshrines the right to a neutral adjudicator in the Sixth
Amendment—that “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury.”323 However, foisting adjudication by jury on the
defendant may do more harm than good. Jurors are often biased against the
defendant for any number of reasons, including the nature of the allegations
against the defendant, the demeanor and reputation of the defendant, or the
jurors’ own bigotry and racism. And there may be no way to rid the jury pool
of these biases. This Article has argued that the way to solve this problem, while
a partial solution, is to give defendants a unilateral right to opt for a bench trial.
Indeed, because the potential dangers strike at the core of a defendant’s due
process rights, recognizing the right to bench trial is constitutionally required.
To this end, this Article proffers a comprehensive, multimodal argument:
Theoretically, the only practicable solution to potential pervasive juror
prejudice is the right to bench trial. Historical and empirical evidence confirm
that the problem of pervasive juror prejudice is widespread, that prosecutors
may capitalize on such juror prejudice, and that our other available solutions are
ineffective. Finally, as a matter of doctrine and precedent, the Sixth
Amendment must be read to recognize such right to waive bench trial.
Is this enough? Definitely not. Our criminal justice system is undergoing
a long-overdue reckoning. Recent events along with powerful activism have laid
bare that the criminal justice system is built upon a foundation interwoven with
pathologies—racism, xenophobia, misogyny, homophobia, transphobia,
classism, and other irrationalities.324 There are at least two strategies in
323. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
324. See, e.g., Laura Cohen, Prosecutors, Power, and Justice: Building an Anti-Racist Prosecutorial
System, 73 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2021) (“George Floyd’s death set off a tsunami of protests
around the country and the world. Even as millions took to the streets to demand an end to statesanctioned violence against Black people, however, the killing continued. Ahmaud Arbery in Georgia.
Daniel Prude in Rochester. Breonna Taylor in Louisville. Daunte Wright in Brooklyn Center,
Minnesota . . . .”); Jenny E. Carroll, Safety, Crisis, and Criminal Law, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 772–73
(2020) (“Just as COVID-19 has ravaged Black, Brown, and poor communities, so too has over-policing
and police violence hovered like a uniformed human plague over the same marginalized
communities. . . . This Essay bears witness to the shifting definitions of safety, danger, and community
wrought by the concurrence of a pandemic and the killings of Breonna Taylor, Rayshard Brooks,
George Floyd, and others.”); Emily St. James, The Time To Panic About Anti-Trans Legislation Is Now,
VOX (Mar. 24, 2022, 10:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/first-person/22977970/anti-trans-legislationtexas-idaho [https://perma.cc/FJ8G-P2S9]; Natasha Ishak, State-Level Republicans Are Going All In on
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reforming the criminal justice system—wholesale revolution or focused
incremental changes. This Article’s proposal is squarely of the second strategy.
It suggests a concrete change of one feature of our criminal justice system with
the goal of better preserving defendants’ rights and improving actual
prosecutions now. But pursuing such a change is not out of contempt for the
first, more ambitious strategy. Rather, I suggest pursuing both strategies
together, with the recognition that wholesale revolution will take time (and
failures), and that focused changes can aid in approximating justice in individual
cases, for real people facing jeopardy.
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Laws,
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https://www.vox.com/2022/3/20/22987539/anti-trans-anti-abortion-laws-texas-florida-idaho [https://
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